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THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES ON INTERJUDGE SENTENCING DISPARITY
PAULJ. HOFER, KEVIN R. BLACKWELL,
& R. BARRY RUBACK*

I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM

The sentencing reforms of the past twenty-five years have
had several goals, including "truth in sentencing," control of
prison populations, and reduction of unwarranted disparity.
The first goal was easily achieved when parole was abolished and
the sentence imposed became the sentence served. Control of
prison populations proved more difficult, and careful evaluation
is needed to determine whether sentencing reform helped to
check, or may have accelerated, the steady rise in prison in-

. Paul J. Hofer, Senior Research Associate, U.S. Sentencing Commission; Kevin
Blackwell, Research Associate, U.S. Sentencing Commission; and Barry Ruback, Professor of Crime, Law, & Justice and Sociology, Pennsylvania State University. The
views in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect an opinion
or policy of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. We would like to thank Patricia Valentino for extensive copy editing and Yosefi Seltzer for his conscientious help in calling
court clerks around the country and coding survey results. In addition, we acknowledge the assistance of staff of the Office of Policy Analysis of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission and the Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center for providing
access to the results of the FJC survey. Responsibility for the use made of these results
or for errors of analysis rests solely with the authors.
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mates and crowding of prisons.' Among the most important
goals motivating reform at the federal level was reduction of
unwarranted sentencing disparity. 2 Yet more than ten years after
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's guidelines,
there is no consensus on whether they have reduced unwarranted disparity in federal sentences.
As reviewed below, the evidence is persuasive that, in the
pre-guideline era, differences among judges in sentencing philosophies were the primary sources of unwarranted disparity.
There are reasons to hope that the federal guidelines have been
effective at controlling these differences: they are the most detailed guidelines ever developed, and they are mandatory.
Judges can depart from the guidelines only for limited reasons
that must be stated on the record, and that are then subject to
appellate review. But these departures from the guidelines, as
well as plea agreements that ignore the guidelines and inconsistencies in application of the guidelines, might reintroduce disparity into the system.
In this paper, after reviewing problems that have plagued
earlier research, we conclude that the "natural experiment"
created by the random assignment of cases to judges in many
courthouses around the country provides the best opportunity
to evaluate the success of the guidelines at reducing disparity.
Although the natural experiment approach does not permit
evaluation of disparity in individual cases, and does not permit
direct examination of prosecutor-created disparity, it does allow
us to draw some conclusions about the effect of the guidelines
on inter-judge disparity. In particular, it permits precise measurement of changes in the "primary judge effect"-the overall
tendency of some judges to be more lenient or severe than others, as measured by differences in average sentences among
1See generally MIcHAEL ToNRY,

SENTENCING MATrERS (1996).

See, e.g., Thomas B.

Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J.

GRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 696 (1995).

2 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The SentencingReform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to UnwarrantedSentenc-

ingDisparityProblem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355 (1991).
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judges with comparable caseloads. We believe this is an important barometer of the success of the guidelines because it represents the "tip of the iceberg" of disparity that would be
observed-and is observed in simulation studies-when identical cases are sentenced by differentjudges.
What we find in the results of this natural experiment is that
the guidelines have significantly reduced overall inter-judge
disparity in sentences imposed, much as the parole guidelines
reduced disparity in time actually served prior to implementation of the sentencing guidelines. Together with the other research reviewed below, these findings suggest that the
sentencing guidelines have had modest but meaningful success
at reducing unwarranted disparity among judges in the sentences imposed on similar crimes and offenders.
The success, however, is uneven. Some types of cases show
no improvement, or show improvement in some cities but not
in others. Further, there is evidence that some regional sentencing differences have increased under the guidelines, particularly in drug trafficking cases. These results demonstrate
the need for further exploration of the sources of these remaining disparities, and of what additional changes are needed to
make fair and uniform sentencing attainable for all types of
cases in all places.
B. DEFINING AND MEASURING UNWARRANTED DISPARITY

To evaluate the guideline's success at reducing disparity we
first must define the problem. A truism of sentencing research
is that sentences should vary according to the seriousness of the
crime and the dangerousness of the offender, but that "unwarranted disparity" is undesirable and unfair. Deciding what types
of variations count as unwarranted disparity has been controversial, however. Most people readily agree that dissimilar treatment of similar offenders would be unwarranted, just as similar
treatment of dissimilar offenders would improperly fail to reflect relevant distinctions among them. But this definition is
purely formal, and thus incomplete, because it does not tell us
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the proper criteria for classifying offenders as similar or dissimilar.3
Treating offenders differently based on a legally impermissible ground, such as race, results in the clearest case of unwarranted disparity--discrimination.4 Discrimination may reflect
intentional or conscious bias toward a group, or be a result of
the distorting effects on rational judgment of unconscious
stereotypes or fears. Either way, it is the most onerous type of
unwarranted disparity and sentencing reform was clearly designed to eliminate it.5 But discrimination is not the only type
of unwarranted disparity.
To most people, different treatment based on any factor
that is irrelevant to the rules and purposes of sentencing-socalled "extralegal" factors, such as an offender's physical appearance-is unwarranted. The most common statistical approaches used to study disparity, multiple regression and
related analyses, are compatible with this definition. In this research, as many of the legally relevant factors as is practically
possible are measured for a large sample of cases, along with
additional factors that are not legally relevant but that may help
explain the sentences imposed. These explanatory factors are
then statistically correlated with one or more outcome measures, typically whether the offender received probation or imprisonment and the length of any prison term imposed. The
amount of variation in sentences that is correlated with the legally relevant factors is statistically removed, or "controlled for,"
and the remaining variation is examined.
For example, it may be that, on average, offenders receive
six months more prison time for each prior conviction. The
' See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REv. 1336,
1340-41 (1997).
4 See 1 ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 8 (1983).

- See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1999) ("The Commission shall assure that the guidelines
and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders.").
6 SeeJohn Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of SentencingResearch, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 154 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (describing the development of increasingly
sophisticated statistical techniques for studying the factors influencing sentencing).
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variation in sentences correlated with prior convictions is subtracted from the outcome measure, and the remainingvariation
in prison lengths is examined to determine what it correlates
with. This process is repeated for all of the legally relevant factors. If the remaining variation correlates with an impermissible
factor, such as race, the data are consistent with discrimination
in sentencing. Other types of unwarranted disparity are suggested if factors such as the region in which the case was prosecuted are correlated with sentences. Variation that is not
accounted for by any of the factors in the model may also be
taken as a measure of unwarranted disparity, although other
7
problems affect this measure.
A long line of regression studies of this kind, even before
implementation of sentencing guidelines, has found that the
most important influences on sentences are not impermissible
factors such as race, or extra-legal factors such as region, but are
the legally relevant factors that should determine sentences,
particularly offense seriousness and an offender's criminal history." Statistical analyses conducted at the U.S. Sentencing
Commission subsequent to implementation of the guidelines
reaffirmed that legally relevant factors remain the most important determinants of sentences today, explaining as much as
70% of the variation in imprisonment lengths. While such findings are reassuring, they do not obviate the need for further research and vigilance against unwarranted disparity, because
most people think that any significant influence of legally ir7 William

Rhodes, FederalCriminal Sentencing: Some Measurement Issues with Application to Pre-Guideline Sentencing Disparity, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1002, 1028
(1991). Variance that is unaccounted for by the model may reflect unwarranted disparities, but it is difficult to know whether and to what extent it represents a real
problem. Such variance may reflect idiosyncratic inclusion and weighting of factors
by individual judges from case-to-case, or legal or extralegal factors that were not included in the model, or measurement error, or some type of model misspecification,
such as failure to account for the complex ways that factors interact. But see Joel
Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge DisparityJustif Empirically Based Sentencing Guidelines2, 18
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 293 (1998) (exploring implications of assuming that variance
unaccounted for by a particular model is nonetheless appropriate variation and contributes to proportionate sentencing).
" Gary Kleck, Racial Discriminationin CriminalSentencing A CriticalEvaluation of the
Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 783, 798-99
(1981).
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relevant factors would be undesirable, even if these factors are
not the primary determinants of sentences. 9
In fact, sentencing reform seems to have been a boon to research on disparity using regression approaches, with over ten
such studies appearing in recent years on just the federal guidelines alone.'0 This type of research is popular because the
guidelines explicitly identify many, if not most, of the factors
that are legally relevant to the sentencing decision, and because
sentencing commissions have collected huge amounts of data
on these factors. But for several reasons, we believe that these
studies can add relatively little, if anything, to our understanding of disparity under the guidelines, and are even less helpful
in evaluating whether the amount of disparity has increased or
decreased.
First, there are significant methodological obstacles to using
regression studies for measuring unwarranted sentencing disparity under the guidelines, and especially for comparing the
amount of disparity before and after guideline implementation.
Many of these obstacles are discussed in a later section. But
perhaps the most significant for present purposes is the difficulty of obtaining comparable data for both time periods.
Second, theoretical disagreements may arise over whose
views about a factor's legal relevance should prevail." For example, whether different treatment is warranted based on of'We reserve for another day the issue of whether some different treatment is too
minimal to be of concern. See interchange between the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the General Accounting Office in GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED 13, 26, 178 (1992) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]. We also do not address whether it might be possible to equate different forms of punishment, such as home confinement and imprisonment, so that similar punishment might be administered in different forms.
" For a review of these studies and a critique of the use of regression analysis in research on discrimination, see PaulJ. Hofer & Kevin Blackwell, SearchingforDiscrimination in Federal Sentencing (submitted for publication; on file with the authors). This
article is an expansion and revision of a previous paper, Paul J. Hofer & Kevin R.
Blackwell, IdentijingSources of Unfairnessin FederalSentencing. (Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Nov. 21, 1997) (on file with
authors).
" See TONRY, supra note 1, at 48; see also Anthony Doob, The United States Sentencing
Guidelines, If you Don't Know Where You Are Going You May Not Get There, in THE
PoLITIcs OF SENTENCING REFORM (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds. 1995).
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fenders' potential for rehabilitation depends on whether one
believes rehabilitation is a legitimate purpose of sentencing.
Views of rehabilitation have clearly changed over time, and disagreement over its role in sentencing still exists. We believe
that because the Sentencing Commission is now legally charged
with deciding what criteria should be legally relevant, it is appropriate to evaluate current and past practice in light of the
Commission's policy decisions. At the same time, we recognize
that what is considered disparity today has not always been considered disparity, and that some ways of evaluating past practice
in light of current policies may "stack the deck" in favor of finding a reduction of disparity. 2
In addition, even if we agree that the Sentencing Commission's views of what factors are legally relevant should prevail,
no one, including the Commission, claims that it has identified
every possible factor. 5 Judges are permitted to take into account factors not specified in the guidelines when deciding
whether to depart, or where within the guideline range to sentence an offender. Disagreements continue to arise over what
factors may be considered. For example, an offender's responsibility for the care of young children strikes many as legally
,2Relying on very detailed guideline definitions of the precise weight that should
be assigned to each factor may arguably "stack the deck" in favor of finding that the
guidelines have been successful. The General Accounting Office conducted a
pre/post comparison as part of its evaluation of the guidelines. GAO REPORT, supra
note 9, app. I, at 40-58. To form matched groups, it used a 1987 prison-impact study
conducted by the Sentencing Commission. The Commission had determined the offense levels and criminal history scores that would have applied to these pre-guideline
cases if they had been sentenced under the guidelines. Pre-guideline cases that
would have fallen at a particular offense level and criminal history score were compared with guideline cases having those same scores. By using this matching period,
each group of pre-guideline cases contained widely varying offense behaviors, but
were compared with guideline cases that fell in a single cell of the sentencing table
and were subject to narrow ranges of sentences. The GAO reported that variance was
significantly reduced under the guidelines for 57 of the 58 groups studied. But it is
no surprise that judges did not view the seriousness of the pre-guideline cases in exactly the same way as the detailed guidelines, which greatly altered the weight given to
the amount of drugs involved in the offense, the defendant's role and characteristics,
and other factors. For a study of how the guidelines changed the influence of these
factors in federal sentencing, see Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristicsin FederalSentencing, 66 So. CAL. L. REv. 367 (1992).
" UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDEu MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A.4, at 6
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
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relevant, warranting a non-prison sentencing for crimes that
might otherwise warrant imprisonment. However, this responsibility is not clearly related to any of the purposes of sentencing
that federal judges are directed by statute to consider,' 5 and lenient treatment for mothers might seem unfair to a childless offender guilty of the same crime.
Even if consensus is reached on which factors are properly
legally relevant, and only those factors are used in imposing sentence, unwarranted disparity might still result if different judges
weigh the factors in different ways. Regression studies of disparity do not generally assess these interjudge differences in weighing factors.' 6 Yet the result is different treatment of similar
offenders by differentjudges. Few would argue that it is fair for
similar offenders to receive disparate sentences solely because of
the judge to whom they happened to be assigned.'7
For these and other methodological reasons discussed below, in this study we do not use multiple regression to measure
disparity, nor do we assess the effects of defendant characteristics, such as gender and race. Instead, we take advantage of the
natural experiment created by the random assignment of cases
to judges to focus on the one extra-legal factor that research
suggests was the most important source of unwarranted disparity in the pre-guideline era-philosophical differences among
judges.

" See Special Issue: Gender and Sentencing, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 130 (1995) (articles discussing impact of sentences on innocent third parties, such as dependent
children, with arguments and cases supporting its relevance and irrelevance).

,See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (1999).
WLuAM D. RICH ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SENTENCING BY
MATHEMATICS? AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1982) (discussing limitation of studies that do not separately

model individual judges); see Rhodes, supra note 7 (proposing a solution to this problem in the context of a two-limit tobit model).
17 See BLUMSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 76.
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C. IDENTIFYING THE GREATEST SOURCES OF UNFAIRNESS AND
UNWARRANTED DISPARITY

1. Characteristicsof the Defendant
Because concern about discrimination was central to the
debate over federal sentencing guidelines, some discussion of
the research on the role and of race and gender before and after guideline implementation is needed. Data have consistently
shown that the average of sentences imposed on AfricanAmericans and on males is longer than the average of sentences
imposed on whites and on females. Surprisingly, the difference
in average sentences between whites and African-Americans and
Hispanics has grown greaterin the federal system since the introduction of sentencing guidelines."' The crucial question is
whether these sentencing differences are due to some form of
racial bias, or whether it results from differences among the
groups in factors that are legally relevant and should be legally
relevant.
The general finding from multiple regression studies of the
effect of race in the pre-guideline era is that differences in sentences imposed on African-Americans and whites, once the effects of legally relevant criteria are taken into account, either
disappear or are relatively small.1 9 Studies of federal sentences
under the guidelines similarly find little or no effect for race af'a See DOUGLAS C. McDONALD & KNNETH E. CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RAE MATrER? 181 (1993).
'9Id. at 21-35 (reviewing studies in federal courts prior to 1993); but see Sentencing
Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the Committee on the Judiciay, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 687-694, tbls. 1-8, (1987); Id. at
685 (testimony of Ilene Nagel, Commissioner, U.S. Sentencing Commission) (presenting preliminary analyses said to provide "strong empirical support for the Congressional proclamation that widespread, unwarranted sentence disparity is
characteristic of the federal system") (emphasis in original). The Commission reported to Congress that sex, race, region where prosecuted, marital status, and other
impermissible or irrelevant factors affected federal sentences prior to implementation of the guidelines. However, the Commission reported as statistically significant
factors that did not rise to the traditional .05 confidence level. In addition, it is questionable whether the matching of offenders used in this preliminary study adequately
captured offenders who were sufficiently similar in legally relevant ways. See generally
MIcAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RAcE, CRIME, AND PUNISHmENT IN AMERICA 69
(1995).
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ter controlling for legally relevant factors. For example, an
analysis published in the popular press concluded that, after
controlling for offense seriousness and criminal history, the average difference between African-American and white sentences
was about 10%, or about two months. Closer analysis suggests
that even this relatively modest finding is overstated, since part
of the racial difference can be explained by legally relevant factors not included in the regression equation.2 ' Gender has
more consistently been shown to influence sentencing, with
women generally receiving relatively lenient treatment, even after controlling for their less serious crimes and less extensive
criminal histories. Under the guidelines, women are somewhat
more likely than men to be sentenced in the lower part of the
guideline range, but gender has much less of an effect on sentences than do the legally-relevant factors.
Given the importance of eliminating any trace of race or
gender discrimination in sentencing, research to measure its
impact will continue. But two lessons should be learned from
previous studies. First, different treatment of similar offenders
by different judges-not different treatment based on race or
gender-appears to have been the greatest source of unwarranted sentencing disparity in the pre-guideline era. Interjudge disparity remains the greatest threat to the success of the
guidelines today. The next section reviews in detail the re"0See Laura Frank, Tennessee's East DistrictAmong Worst, THE TENNESSEAN, Sept. 24,
1995, at 17A. See also Mary Pat Flaherty &Joan Biskupic, Rules Often Impose Toughest
Penaltieson Poor,Minorities,WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1996, at A26 (using different methodology, but also finding small effects for race of the defendant, ranging from a few extra days for short sentences to a few extra weeks for multi-year sentences).
2'A reanalysis by research staff of the Sentencing Commission found that the race
effect disappeared entirely once the effects of departures and mandatory minimum
statutes were taken into account. (Commission analysis on file with the authors.) U.S.
Sentencing Commission Internal Memorandum from Kevin Blackwell to Paul Martin
an. Commissioner Michael Galacek (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with the author). For a
general discussion of methodological problems with studies of the effect of race under the guidelines, see Hofer & Blackwell, Searchingfor Discriminationin Federal Sentencing, supra note 10.
"See Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing
System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. Cim. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 181, 221 (1994);
PhyllisJ. Newton et al., Gender, Individuality and the FederalSentencing Guidelines,8 FED.
SENTENCINGREP. 148, 152-53 (1995).
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search demonstrating how differing judicial philosophies affect
sentences.
Second, the gap between the average sentences of AfricanAmericans and whites is not due to extra-legal factors, but is a
result of the legally relevant factors themselves. The gap has
grown wider in the past decade because Congress increased the
punishment for the types of crimes disproportionately committed by African-Americans, Hispanics, and men, particularly drug
trafficking and firearm offenses. Multiple regression studies
that "control for" the type of crime committed thus miss an important point. The crucial questions about the fairness of sentencing today concern whether factors that are legally relevant,
and that have a disproportionate adverse impact on AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, and men, should be legally relevant. Are
there sufficient policy reasons, grounded in the purposes of sentencing, to treat some types of offenses much more harshly than
others, given that doing so will exacerbate sentencing differences among racial and gender groups?
Douglas McDonald and Kenneth Carlson, in the most sophisticated study to date of the effects of race on federal sentencing, 3 report that the increase in the gap between average
sentences for whites and African-Americans is explained largely
by the larger portions of African-American offenders sentenced
for drug trafficking crimes, especially crack cocaine offenses. 24
Their study did not attempt to assess whether the 100-to-1 quantity ratio between crack and powder cocaine found in current
law was justified on policy grounds.25 The Sentencing Commission's own subsequent study determined that there was no sufficient policy basis for this ratio. 5 As of this writing, efforts to
change these penalty statutes have been unsuccessful. But in
any event, it is clear that the most important research and policy
"See McDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 18.
" Id. at 13-14.
"See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1999).
2U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING PoucY

196-97

(1993). The Commission proposed to equalize treatment for similar amounts of
crack and powder. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 60 FED. REG. 25

(1995) (proposed May 12, 1995). However, Congress disapproved this amendment.
Pub. L. No. 104-138, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
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debates about the racial and gender fairness of sentences will
not concern the effects of discrimination but will be about what
factors should be legally relevant to the purposes of sentencing.
2. Characteristicsof theJudge and the Court
The popular conception of a range of judicial temperaments-from "hanging" judges to "soft" ones-has a basis in
truth. Judges have different sentencing philosophies.27 John
Carroll et al. have demonstrated that a constellation of individual differences, including one's background and personality, relates to one's ideology, which in turn is reflected in how one
thinks about the causes of crime and the goals of sentencing. 8
In the simplest terms, "liberals" tend to believe that factors external to the offender are responsible for criminal behavior.
Rehabilitation is more of a sentencing goal for these judges,
leading to greater reliance on probation and less concern with
retribution. "Conservatives" believe that offenders choose to
commit crimes. They are more punishment-oriented and tend
to impose longer prison terms.
Several lines of evidence suggest that philosophical differences among judges accounted for a significant portion of the
differences in sentences imposed on offenders in the federal
courts prior to enactment of the sentencing guidelines. Shari
Diamond and Hans Zeisel, discussing results obtained from a
study of federal "sentencing councils" (at which panels ofjudges
would independently review cases and set sentences, and then
meet with the judge responsible for imposing the binding sentence), concluded that "it is reasonable to infer that the judges'
differing sentencing philosophies are a primary cause of the
disparity."2
"JoHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PRoCEss 22 (1971) ("Indeed, it would
now be considered naive to assume that judges and magistrates can be expected to
process information impartially and apply mechanically the appropriate legal principles to sentencing problems. Few sentencingjudges themselves would claim that sentencing is a completely rational and mechanical process.").
8
John S. Carroll et al., Sentencing Goals, CasualAttributions,Ideology, and Personality,
52J. PERSONAIY& SOC. PSYCH-OL 107 (1987).
"Shari S. Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity
and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 109, 114 (1975).
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In another well-known early study--the Federal Judicial
Center's Second Circuit Study-Anthony Partridge and William
Eldridge found dramatic differences among judges in the sentences they imposed hypothetically on identical offenders."0
Judges were sent actual presentence reports for twenty defendants representing a range of typical offenses, and asked what
sentence they would impose. Differences of several years were
common; in one case more than seventeen years separated the
most severe from the least severe sentence. The data showed
that a handful of judges were consistently much more severe or
more lenient than their colleagues. However, in a finding with
implications for the present study, the researchers noted that
the majority of judges, on average, gave sentences of comparable severity to their fellow judges. But the judges had very different opinions about which particular cases deserved more
severe or more lenient punishment. In the long run, these differences canceled out and average sentences were fairly similar.
But the relative similarity in the overall averages masked a
greater disparity at the individual case level.
Researchers at the Institute for Law and Social Research
(INSLAW) conducted an expansion of the FederalJudicial Center (FJC) study that measured the precise contribution of philosophical differences to sentencing disparity. Brian Forst and
Charles Wellford analyzed the role of sentencing goals in a
sample of 264 federal judges sentencing a series of hypothetical
cases." They found that the judges who were oriented towards
utilitarian goals (incapacitation and deterrence) gave sentences
that were at least ten months longer than judges with other
goals in mind. Their analysis divided inter-judge disparity into
two types. The "primaryjudge effect' was defined as the general
tendency for "toughness or leniency among the various judges;"
as measured by differences in their overall average sentence
lengths. The "interaction effect' was defined as disagreement

"

ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE

SECOND CIRCUIT STUDY: A REPORT TO THEJUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36 (1974).
s' Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, Punishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing
Guidelines EmpiricallyFromPrinciplesofPunishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 799, 813 (1981).
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among judges about the seriousness of particular types of cases,
regardless of any overall tendency to be harsh or lenient.
In a multiple regression analysis of these data, Forst and
Wellford found that 21% of the variance in prison terms was
explained by the primary judge effect.32 Like Partridge and Eldridge, however, they found that even more variation was explained by the interaction of judges with the particular
characteristics of different offenses and offenders. Significant
disparity arises from the general tendency of some judges to be
relatively severe or lenient, but even more disparity arises from
differences in opinions about the seriousness of particular offenses and the purposes of sentencing in specific types of cases. 3,
In other words, the primary judge effect measured only the "tip
of the iceberg" of the underlying disparity that arose in specific
case types.
Other researchers have noted that judicial philosophy is
likely to evolve over time and with experience.34 Martha Myers
found that prior experience as a prosecutor, as well as the
judge's religion, were significantly related to the use of incarceration as opposed to probation and to sentence length.35 Results are inconsistent on whether other general demographic
judicial characteristics, such as race or social background, might
also be associated with disparate sentences imposed on similar
offenders. Malcolm Holmes et al. reported that the ethnicity of
" Id. The "variance" is the most conmon statistical measure of the distribution of
scores on a measure, such as years of imprisonment. It is calculated by determining
the mean, or average, of all the scores in a population and then calculating the distance of each individual score from the mean. The sum of these distances divided by
the number of scores is the total variance. (For statistical reasons, the distances are
squared before summing.) Depending on the particular research design that is employed, multiple regression or other statistical techniques discussed below may allow
researchers to apportion the percentage of the total variance that is accounted for by
various factors measured in the research.
" See also Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decision Making: The Logic of Sentence Decisions
and the Extent and Sources of SentenceDisparity,72J. CRIM. L. & CGaMINOLOGY 524 (1981)
(offering additional analysis of these same data confirming that judges' perceptions
and philosophy explain a large portion of variance in sentences imposed).
' Rod A. Bond & Nigel F. Lemon, Training,Experience, and Magistrates'Sentencing
Philosophies,5 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 123 (1981).
" Martha A. Myers, Social Background and the Sentencing Behavior of Judges, 26
CRMINOLOGY 649 (1988) (finding that olderjudges gave slightly longer sentences).
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the judge was related to favoritism.6 Cassia Spohn reported that
African-American defendants are sentenced more harshly than
whites, but that this was true for sentences imposed by both
white and African-Americanjudges
In addition to differences in philosophy among individual
judges, several studies have found geographical differences in
sentencing patterns by federal judges, suggesting that different
political climates or court cultures can affect sentences. Research sponsored by the Department of Justice in the 1970s
used data from six federal districts representing four geographical areas."' Sentences for eight offenses-bank robbery, bank
embezzlement, counterfeiting, larceny from interstate commerce, auto theft, narcotics offenses, and Selective Service Act
violations-were selected for analysis. The results showed that
judges differed in the importance they placed on various factors
depending on the region in which they sat.8 9
Studies in both federal and state systems have repeatedly
found that offenders sentenced in rural areas tend to receive
harsher sentences than those sentenced in urban courts. 40 Beverly Blair Cook, studying Selective Service cases in the federal
courts, found that "[t]he severity.., of the judges... differed
according to the population of the city in which they decided
the case, with the judges in the smallest cities giving the most
severe sentences. 41 John Kramer and Jeffery Ulmer found that
Malcolm D. Holmes, Judges'Ethnicityand Minority Sentencing, Evidence Concerning
Hispanics,74 Soc. Sci. Q. 496, 502 (1993).
" Cassia Spohn, The SentencingDecisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities,24 L. & Soc. REv. 1198 (1990).
- L. Paul Sutton, Federal Sentencing Patterns: A Study of Geographical Variations, 18
U.S. DEP'T. oFJusT. 7 (1978).
'9See Glen T. Broach et al., State Political Culture and Sentence Severity in FederalDistrict Courts, 16 CRmNOLOGy 373, 379-81 (1978) (finding influence ofjudicial philosophy and local political environment on sentencing in Selective Service cases).
40
Thomas L.Austin, The Influence of Court Location on Type of Criminal Sentence: The
Rural-UrbanFactor,9J. CRIM.JUST. 305, 314 (1981). SeeJohn Hagan, CriminalJusticein
Rural and Urban Communities: A Study of the BureaucratizationofJustice, 55 Soc. FORCES
597, 608-10 (1977); Carl E. Pope, The Influence of Social and Legal Factors on Sentencing
Dispositions:A PreliminaryAnalysis of Offender Based TransactionStatistics,4J. CRIM. JUST.
203, 217 (1976).
41Beverly Blair Cook, SentencingBehavior of FederalJudges: Draft Cases-1972,42 U.
GIN. L. REV. 597, 612 (1973).
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even the promulgation of formal sentencing guidelines had not
completely eliminated regional disparities in Pennsylvania.42
Clearly, structured sentencing systems have a major challenge in controlling disparities among judges and among regions. The U.S. Sentencing Commission sought to meet this
challenge with extraordinarily detailed and mandatory sentencing rules.
D. HOW THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES SEEK TO REDUCE
UNWARRANTED DISPARITY

Sentencing reform aimed to replace the discretion of individual judges with centralized decision-making by a Sentencing
Commission, which would settle questions of policy in a uniform way through research, deliberation, and rule-making. In
guidelines aimed to replace discretion with
short, sentencing
43
law.
of
the rule
The federal guidelines represent perhaps the most ambitious attempt to structure sentencing decisions. Prior to November 1, 1987, federal judges could base their decisions on
virtually any information they considered important. They did
not have to explain what information they took into account,
what weight they attached to the information, or how they combined the information to reach a decision. Moreover, sentences
were not reviewable as long as they were within the broad statutory limits.44
In contra t, under the guidelines, the information relevant
to sentencing is dictated by detailed rules. These rules concern
4
John Kramer &Jeffery Ulmer, Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationalityand SentencingDisparity,34 CRIMINOLOGY 383 (1996).
4' M.E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). Others, of
course, have a less charitable way of defining this mission. See KATE STITH &JOSE A.
CABRANES, FEAR OFJUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURT 7 (1998)
(describing the guidelines' "neoclassical preoccupation with artificial order [which]
may seem anachronistic in what many intellectuals insist is our 'post-modern' or
'post-enlightenment' age.... [T]he Guidelines represent the continuing triumph of
the administrative state.").
" For general introductions to the federal sentencing guidelines by several original members of the Commission and key staff, see Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1
(1988); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines8OJ.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883 (1990); Wilkins et a]., supra note 2.
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the scope of conduct by defendants and their accomplices that
is to be taken into account for sentencing purposes; the harms
caused by the offense, particularly the amount of drugs or
money involved and the degree of victim injury; the offender's
post-indictment behavior; the offender's criminal history; and a
host of other factors. Points are added and subtracted to obtain
an offense level and a criminal history score, which locates the
offender in one of 258 cells on a Sentencing Table. Each cell
provides a presumptive imprisonment range, which by statute
can be no wider than six months or 25% of the minimum of the
range, whichever is larger.
Unlike "advisory" guideline systems that have been implemented in some jurisdictions, the federal guidelines are mandatory; judges are not free to ignore them. Departures from the
guideline range are allowed in certain circumstances, however,
which is why some commentators call federal-type guidelines
"presumptive. 45 But to impose a sentence outside the guideline
range, the judge must articulate reasons on the record identifying "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission .

.

. that should result in a sentence different

from that described. 46 All departures are then subject to appellate review. Upward departures may be appealed by the de" The sentencing guidelines differ in this way from mandatory minimum penalty
statutes, which provide no general departure mechanism for cases that meet the
statutory requirements (typically a certain amount of drugs trafficked) even if a case
is in other respects unusual. For this reason, judicial opposition to mandatory minimum statutes is even more vehement than to presumptive guidelines. MOLLY T.
JOHNSON & ScoTT A. GILBERT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERALJuDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY (1997).

Certain

waivers of the mandatory minimum statutory penalties are allowed in the federal system for persons who provide substantial assistance with the prosecution of other persons, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, and for certain low-level, non-violent,
first-time offenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)-(f) (1985 & Supp. 1999); see also U.S.S.G.
§§ 5K1.1, at 323-35, §5C1.2, at 323-25, 356 (1998). Guideline departures or offense
level reductions are permitted for these same groups.
" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1999). See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), for a
recent description of howjudges are to determine whether to depart from the guidelines, and how the appellate courts are to review such departures. See also Paul J.
Hofer et al., DepartureRates and Reasons afterKoon v. U.S., 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 284
(1997); PaulJ. Hofer, Discretion to Depart after Koon v. U.S., 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 8
(1996).
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fense; downward departures may be appealed by the prosecution. Any party can appeal a sentence if it involves an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines.47
1. PotentialProblems
With detailed rules such as these, one might expect that
unwarranted disparity would be dramatically reduced, if not
eliminated altogether. But potential problems with guideline
systems have been recognized from the beginning. Some of
these might be found in any guideline system and some are
unique to the federal system.
Judges could simply fail to comply with the guidelines. Although judges often resist the introduction of mandatory guidelines, data from several states and the federal system show that
guidelines have changed sentencing practices. With important
caveats discussed below, judges generally comply with them.48
The Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Commission
anticipated that the bulk of cases would be sentenced within the
applicable guideline range. 49 The Commission recognized that
the guidelines could not anticipate every circumstance and encouraged judges to depart in some situations. But the Commission did not expect departures to be very frequent, since the
guidelines were based largely on an empirical analysis of the factors thatjudges had typically held to be relevant to sentencing.
Data confirm that departures based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances have been just a small portion of sentences
under the guidelines. Although there has been slow growth in
the rate of downward departures, this has been offset to some
extent by a reduction in the rate of upward departures. Departures based on circumstances not taken into account by the
guidelines have generally represented less than 10% of all sen-

17 18

U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2) (1999).
" See TONRY, supra note 1, at 32-39; U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, Vols. 1 & 2, THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES
SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DIsPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION,
AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING (1991) [hereinafter FOUR-YEAR
EVALUATION].
49

U.S.S.G., ch.1, pt. A.4(b), at 6, § 5K2.0, at 357-59.
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tences in any given year. Even the 1995 Supreme Court decision in Koon v. United States, which was interpreted by some as a
signal of a more permissive departure standard, has not significantly increased the departure rate. 1 This level of compliance,
along with judicial review of departures to ensure that they truly
unusual cases, should be sufficient to "cure wide disrepresent
52
parity."
However, two other kinds of "departures"-one legally recognized and one not-could reintroduce disparity. First, the
federal guidelines authorize departure for defendants who offer
"substantial assistance to authorities" in the prosecution of
other persons. This departure is meant to provide an incentive
for persons to provide evidence against other offenders or to
help law enforcement in various ways. Motions for departure
on this basis must be made by the prosecution. If the motion is
granted, the judge has discretion to sentence outside the guidelines and in some cases, depending on the precise motion, outside the otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum.
The portion of cases receiving these departures has increased over 400% in recent years.5 Because Congress and the
Commission decided that this assistance is a legally relevant factor, sentence reductions based on it are not unwarranted under
our definition and do not necessarily create disparity. However,
some research suggests that these departures are used as a
means for avoiding the guideline sentence in cases where the
judge and the prosecutor believe the applicable sentence is in-

"OU.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS

39, fig. G (1996) (showing percentage of sentences within guideline range 1989 to
1996).
5'See Hofer et al., DepartureRates, supra note 46, at 284-91. See also Hofer, Discretion
to Depart, supranote 46, at 8-13 (arguing that the "heartland" analysis by which judges
are to decide whether departure is appropriate is subject to varying interpretation
and inconsistent application and could lead to disparity if used extensively).
,U.S.S.G., ch.1, pt. A.5, at 11.
sU.S.S.G., § 5K1.1, at 356.
s,See United States v. Melendez, 518 U.S. 120, 128-30 (1996).
5 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 39 (showing increase from
3.5% in 1989 to 19.7% in 1995).
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Research
appropriate, even if no real assistance is provided.
has also shown that prosecutors in different cities have different
policies about when a motion for departure is justified, and that
the policies that exist are not followed consistenly. 7 Further,
even though the guideline offers some guidance on the factors
to be considered by judges when determining the extent of the
reduction, 58 different judges may weigh these factors differently,
creating a form of inter-judge disparity.
A second type of departure that could reintroduce unwarranted disparity is covert guideline circumvention, or what some
observers have called "hidden departures. 59 Some judges may
relax strict adherence to the actual facts of the case, and instead
adopt a result-oriented approach that begins with the sentence
they wish to impose and works backward to identify the facts
leading to that result. It may not even be necessary to ignore
facts. Many findings required by the guidelines are sufficiently
subjective to afford significant discretion to those who wish to
use it. The resulting sentence is not a true departure because
there is nothing unusual about the case that merits a sentence
outside the guideline range. Instead, the judge simply disagrees
with the choices of Congress and the Commission and imposes
" Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities:An EmpiricalStudy
of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 501, 550 (1992) ("The section 5K1.1 motion is also used to avoid guideline
ranges or mandatory minimum sentences for sympathetic defendants-even when
there has been no genuine substantial assistance.").
' Linda Drazga Maxfield &John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical
Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Practice (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, U.S. Sentencing Commission, available on the Commission's website
<http://www.ussc.gov/research.htm> (visited Feb. 24, 2000) and on file with
authors).
58 U.S.S.G., §5Kl.1(a), at 356. Some circuits have rules for determining the
amount of reduction that is appropriate, but the relevant statutes and guidelines prescribe no set amount of reduction for various forms of assistance.
'9 See HON. JOSEPH F. WEIS ET AL., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE

(1990) ("[T]he rigidity of the guidelines is causing a massive, though unintended,
Some
transfer of discretion and authority from the court to the prosecutor ....
prosecutors (and some defense counsel) have evaded and manipulated the guidelines .... Some district judges report feeling enormous pressure to accept pleas even
though they clearly do not comport with the guidelines."); see also Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencingin the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing
Process:The Problem is Uniformily, Not Disparity,29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992).
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a different sentence than the one called for by the statutes and
guidelines.
Another problem that could reintroduce disparity is ambiguity and complexity in the guidelines. Judges wishing to apply
the guidelines literally may nonetheless be frustrated by the
complexity of some of the guideline provisions. The relevant
conduct guideline, on which all other guideline calculations
rest, is notoriously complicated and subject to differing interpretations.' ° Application of the role in the offense guideline
depends on drawing distinctions among highly ambiguous
phrases such as "minor" and "minimal" roles.
Finally, plea bargaining has long been recognized as a
threat to the effectiveness of the guidelines at reducing unwarranted disparity."' Because sentences in a guideline system are

tied directly to the charges of conviction and the facts of the
case, they are both more predictable and potentially more subject to control by prosecutors. Prosecutors and defense attorneys may engage in "fact bargaining"-stipulating to facts that
do not accurately reflect the findings that could be established
62
at the sentencing hearing. Federal prosecutors can often cap a
defendant's exposure to punishment by "charge bargaining."
6' Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of the
Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 330 (1992). A description
of a four-defendant drug conspiracy was sent to a random sample of 46 probation officers around the country. Different defendants were involved with different amounts
of drugs, and the offense level applicable to each defendant depended on how the
probation officer interpreted the relevant conduct guideline. Considerable variation
was found, particularly in the sentencing of the lowest-level defendant, with sentences
ranging from one to five years imprisonment. The relevant conduct guideline was
amended to clarify its application later in 1992, so it is unclear to what extent the disparities found in this study would continue today. See PaulJ. Hofer, Implications of the
Relevant Conduct Study Forthe Revised Guideline,4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 334 (1992).
" STEPHEN

J.

SCHULEOFER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING

REFORM: REPORT TO THE FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER (1979); but see Terance D. Miethe,

Chargingand Plea BargainingPracticesUnderDeterminateSentencing: An Investigation of the
HydraulicDisplacementof Discretion, 78J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987) (arguing
that displacement of discretion from judges to prosecutors is not inevitable); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978).
" Special Issue: Assessing the Probation Officers' Survey: Does Fact BargainingUndermine
the Sentencing Guidelines.', 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 299 (1996) (reporting survey results
that plea agreements often do not contain the full offense conduct).
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In some cases the relevant conduct guideline will bring the uncharged conduct into consideration at sentencing. But in no
case can a sentence exceed the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction. Prosecutors also control whether certain
statutory sentencing enhancements will be applied, for example, for a defendant's use of a firearm or for a prior record of
similar crimes.
Unless the government exercises its discretion to bring and
press charges and prove facts in a similar way in similar cases,
unwarranted sentencing disparity can easily result. Indeed, in a
detailed presumptive guideline system, the role of the judge and
the parole board are diminished or eliminated altogether, so
disparity arising from prosecutorial discretion will go largely
unchecked by later decisions. While some have argued that reducing disparity due to plea bargaining is not a concern of sentencing guidelines, which were intended to curtail only judicial
discretion, it is hard to see the advantages of a system that replaces inter-judge with inter-prosecutor disparity. Prosecutors
generally lack the experience of judges and have. many considerations acting upon their decisions other than achieving the
goal of uniform sentences. 3
Due to these concerns, Congress, the Commission, and the
Department ofJustice took steps to ensure that plea bargaining
would not undermine the guidelines. Congress authorized the
Commission to promulgate policy statements concerning judicial review of plea agreements. 64 The Commission did so, directing judges to review plea agreements before accepting them to
ensure that they would not undermine the sentencing guidelines.6 Further, the Commission made the reduction given defendants as a reward for pleading guilty a standardized and
explicit part of the guideline structure in the "acceptance of responsibility" guideline.& A partly "real offense" system was cre65 SeeJeffrey

Standen, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.

1471 (1993) (reviewing the dangers of prosecutors' "monopsonist" control of discretion under the federal guidelines).
' 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2) (E) (1988).
5
U.S.S.G., SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND PLEA AGREEMENTS, ch. 6, at 365-72.
'6U.S.S.G., ch. 3, part E.1.1, at 285-87.
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ated through the relevant conduct guideline so that sentences
would depend less on the charges of conviction and more on
the actual facts of the case as found by the judge. Finally, the
Department of Justice issued policies to discourage undercharging and other practices that could result in some offenders
receiving sentences shorter than the guidelines applicable to
their full offense conduct.68
The success of these efforts, however, is unclear. The most
comprehensive empirical study of plea bargaining under the
guidelines concluded that, while adherence to the guidelines is
the predominant pattern, circumvention of the guidelines occurs in 20-35% of cases, especially in drug and weapon cases in
which the guideline sentence is tied to mandatory minimum
statutes instead of to data on past sentencing practices. The
authors concluded that prosecutorial discretion "if unchecked,
has the potential to recreate the very disparities that the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to alleviate." 9 The Commission's own Four-YearEvaluationfound that 17% of all guilty plea
cases indicate some form of plea impact, such as oral or written
plea agreements that dismiss charges or stipulations that underrepresent the seriousness of the offense.70 A recent survey of
district court judges revealed that 75% believe that prosecutors
have the greatest influence on the final guideline sentence relative to the judge, defense attorney, and probation officer, and
73% believe that plea bargains are a source of hidden dispar-

67

For a discussion of the guidelines' principle of "Relevant Conduct," see William
W. Wilkins & John Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines,41 S.C. L. REV. 495 (1990).
SpecialIssue:JusticeDepartmentGuidancefor Prosecutors:Fifteen Years of Chargingand
Plea Policies,6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 298 (1994).
" See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, PleaNegotiations Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-MistrettaEra, 91
Nw. L. REv. 1284, 1284 (1997); see also Ilene H. Nagel & StephenJ. Schulhofer, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The FirstFifteen Months, 27 AMi. CRIM.
L. R. 231, 232-88 (1989); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 56.
'aFOUR-YEAR EVALUATION, supranote 48, at 412. In 14% of all guilty plea cases, the
plea agreement resulted in a sentence below the minimum of the original guideline
range, resulting in an average reduction of 40 months.
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ity. 7' Probation officers report that "fact bargaining" is undermining the sentencing guidelines. 2
While the evidence is insufficient to reach firm conclusions
about how frequently the guidelines fail to structure discretion
due to misuse of departures, inconsistent interpretation of
complex or ambiguous provisions, or plea bargains that underrepresent the seriousness of the offender's conduct, there is
reason to believe that it may be enough to introduce significant
disparity into the system. Clearly, the hypothesis that disparity
remains, or has even increased, under the guidelines cannot be
dismissed out of hand. Empirical study is needed to measure
the effectiveness of the guidelines.
II. PREvious EVALUATIONS OF UNWARRANTED DISPARITY IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM

Students of sentencing reform have recognized the need for
more and better research to evaluate how well these reforms
have reduced unwarranted disparity. As noted by a recent panel
of experts, "[t] he past 20 years have produced many accusations
but few studies documenting the misuse of discretion by judges,
parole boards, and corrections officials, resulting in unwarranted disparity."73 The panel concluded that "more research is
needed to assess whether guidelines and other forms of structured sentencing are reducing sentencing disparity. ' 74
In a recent review of research on the success of sentencing
guidelines,75 Michael Tonry noted that every commission has
claimed success, but conceptual and methodological difficulties
with the evaluation studies make it difficult to say with certainty
whether and how much disparity has been reduced. Evaluations
of state systems have been few and independent evaluations al"JOHNSON & GILBERT, supranote 45, at 6-11.

Douglas A. Berman, Editor's Observation:Is FactBargainingUnderminingthe Sentencing Guidelines?Probative Officer's Survey, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 300 (1996) (reporting
results of a probation officer survey and commenting on the findings that fact bargaining is reintroducing sentencing disparity).
73 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 5 (1996).

71Id. at xvii.

7- SeeTONRY, supra note 1, at 40.
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most nonexistent.7 6 The available data suggest that disparity has
likely been reduced in these jurisdictions from what it would
have been without the guidelines, but the results are far from
definitive.
Because of the greater visibility of the federal system and
the completeness of the data base, the federal system has been
evaluated more thoroughly than any other, both by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission itself and by outside researchers. However, this greater scrutiny has not increased the consensus about
whether disparity has been reduced. Indeed, opinions vary
from those who believe disparity has been reduced,7 7 to those
who cannot tell whether there has been significant change, 78 to
those who think disparity has actually gotten worse under the
guidelines.7 Divergent points of view are common in the arena
of sentencing policy. But such a range of opinion about an important empiricalmatter indicates a failure of research to provide
objective, quantified answers to these essentially factual questions. This failure begs for explanation.
A. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN DISPARITY RESEARCH

Disparity research has involved a remarkable variety of
methods, each of which has strengths and weaknesses. Because
no one method can provide definitive answers, conclusions
about the existence of disparity and the effectiveness of sentencing guidelines will necessarily involve "triangulation" between
76

The exception is Minnesota, where a thoughtful independent evaluation showed

that the guidelines did have some success at reducing sentencing disparity, though
some of the initial success eroded with time. In addition, disparity arising from plea
bargaining remained. See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCrUmiNG CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE
EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDEuNE (1988); Terance D. Miethe &
Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic DisparitiesUnder Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparisonof Pre- and Post-GuidelinePracticesin Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337 (1985); Lisa
Stolzenberg & Steward J. D'Alessio, Sentencing and UnwarrantedDisparity:An Empirical
Assessment of the Long-Term Impact of Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 32 CRIMINOLOGY
301 (1994).
" FOUR-YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 48, at 13; Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas
Sager, Are the FederalSentencing GuidelinesMeeting CongressionalGoals?: An Empirical and
Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORYL.J. 393 (1991).
7"GAO REPORT, supranote 9.
" Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991).

HOFE

BLACKWELL,

RUBACK

[Vol. 90

different methods and "generalization" from the limited samples in the studies to the larger question of disparity in the federal system. The first step toward reaching reasonable
conclusions about the success of the guidelines is to understand
the different methods and the questions that can be answered
by each.8"
1. Simulations Versus Actual Cases
A great deal of important research on sentencing disparity
has asked judges to impose sentences in simulated cases. The
Federal Judicial Center's Second Circuit study and the INSLAW
study, both discussed earlier, were perhaps the most important
evidence establishing the existence of disparity in the preguidelines era.81 The primary advantage of this approach is
clear: because different decision-makers are asked to sentence
identical cases, any differences observed in their sentences can
readily be attributed to differences among the judges. The disadvantage is that hypothetical situations may be so different
from actual sentencing that the results cannot be generalized to
the real world. In a real sentencing, the judge receives a
lengthy presentence report, conducts a hearing, and observes a
live defendant. Hypothetical cases may contain relatively impoverished information. Simulation studies use a limited sample of cases, which may be selected to illustrate differences
among judges instead of accurately reflecting the overall
caseload. Thus, simulations can exaggerate the amount of inter-judge disparity among routine cases.
On balance, however, simulation studies can provide powerful evidence of the existence of inter-judge differences and the
so We do not include in our review interview results or opinion surveys asking

judges and others whether disparity has increased or decreased under the guidelines.
See, e.g., FoUR-YEAR EvALUATION, supra note 48, ch. 3, at 31-268 (reporting results of
interviews and surveys of key participants in the sentencing process). While such
studies are appropriate to gauge participant perceptions, they are an unsound basis
for drawing objective conclusions because they may be influenced by the respondent's limited sample of experience or by their expectations.
"For a short review of the studies relied upon in the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act see Exhibits on the 25 percent Rule: Exhibit A, Summary of PreGuidelines Sentencing Disparity Discussed in the Legislative History of the Sentencing Reform
Act, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 189 (1995).
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personality and philosophy factors that contribute to disparity.
But they do not provide good estimates of the amount of such
disparity in the real world. Nor do they seem likely to permit
clear evaluation of success of the guidelines at reducing such
disparity.82 For this we need data collected on actual sentences.
2. Controlledand Quasi-Experiments
When using real-world data, the task of isolating the effect
of judges and the effect of the guidelines becomes much more
complicated. A controlled experiment is an ideal method to
isolate the effect of one factor. If the guidelines had been implemented in a randomly-selected half of the states, the other
half could have served as a "control" group. Both groups would
have been subject to similar historical trends occurring at the
same time as guideline implementation, such as new mandatory
minimums, "get tough" prosecution policies, changes in law enforcement budgets, and changes in the ideological composition
of the bench. Comparing the guideline states with the control
states would have permited us to focus on the effects due solely
to the guidelines. But such an experimental design was not
used and ethically could not be used, so the problem of identifying which changes were caused specifically by the guidelines is
more difficult.
Social scientists have developed other methods-called
quasi-experimental designs-for isolating the effects of reform
measures when controlled experiments are not possible."3 Time

52

See Milton Heumann, Empirical Questions and Data Sources: Guideline and Sentenc-

ing Research in the Federal System, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 15 (1993) (calling for use of
simulations to study disparity in the guideline system). Replication of the FJC's Second Circuit Study is the obvious choice for using simulation to evaluate whether the
guidelines have reduced disparity, but we are skeptical that meaningful pre/postimplementation comparisons are possible. The cases used in the FJC cases may not
contain sufficient information for guideline application. Changing the cases could
render the pre/post-comparison problematic. Even if the cases include sufficient information for guideline application, they might lack information that could justify a
departure. The role of plea bargaining in creating disparity would also go unmeasured in such a study.
"See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION (1979)
(describing non-experimental approaches to inferring causality when strictly experimental research designs are not possible).
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series analysis is one such method that involves collecting data
over a long period and projecting what changes would be expected in some outcome measure, for example, the rate of
guilty pleas, if the same linear, cyclical, or other trends continue
after an intervention as were observed before. Actual changes
are compared to the projections, and any differences found are
attributed to the intervention. Time series analysis is not feasible, however, if insufficient data are available to establish clear
trends or if it cannot be assumed that the trends would continue absent the intervention. Further, while time series analysis may be appropriate for studying the rate of guilty pleas or
changes in average sentence length, it is not easily applied to
studying changes in the amount of disparityin sentence lengths
among differentjudges. 84
A simpler quasi-experimental design than a time series
analysis is a pre/post comparison. The amount of disparity at
one time before guideline implementation is compared to the
amount at a time afterward. This method cannot detect trends
that were occurring before implementation, and the results may
mistakenly be taken to suggest that all differences between the
two times are due to the guidelines. But pre/post comparisons
can demonstrate whether any change has occurred, and can be
supplemented with other methods to help identify the event between the two points that might have caused the change. The
analysis presented in later sections is a pre/post comparison design.
Strict isolation of the specific effects of the guidelines is not
always necessary. Some changes, though technically not part of
the guidelines, are intrinsically bound up with guideline implementation. For example, the guidelines affected plea bargaining by creating new forms of bargains, by altering the
incentives bearing on the parties, and by making the plea
8' For

an example of a time series analysis of the effect of the guidelines, see FOUR-

YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 48, at 394-410, which found that neither the Anti-Drug

Abuse Act of 1988, the implementation of the guidelines, the Mistretta decision, nor
the "Thornburgh Memo" had any apparent effect on major indices of case processing
in the federal courts. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 appeared to be associated
with increased case filings, resolutions, and guilty pleas, but the effect was confounded with data changes occurring at the same time.
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agreement more determinative of the final sentence. These
changes naturally accompany implementation of a detailed presumptive guideline system, and these effects can fairly be considered part of the change to a guideline system of the type
found in the federal courts.
Other changes occurred at the same time as the guidelines
but were not a necessary part of the switch to a guideline system.
Foremost among these was the rise of retribution-and the decline of rehabilitation-as the primary goal of sentencing. This
trend was reflected in the "war on drugs," in mandatory minimum statutes and other legislation, and to some extent in
changes in the composition of the federal bench. Some simple
strategies, for example studying only judges who sentenced in
both time periods, allow for partial isolation of these effects.
from all
But disentangling implementation of the guidelines
a
impossible.
is
developments
contemporaneous
other

85William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatoy Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 So. CAL. L. REv. 405 (1992) (arguing that the effects cannot be
disentangled). But see, A. Abigail Payne, Does InterJudge Disparity Really Matter? An
Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three FederalDistrict Courts, 17 INT. REV. L.
& ECON. 337 (1997). Payne attempted to isolate the effects of the guidelines from the
effects of the mandatory minimum statutes by separately analyzing embezzlement,
fraud, and theft cases (EFT cases) and drug trafficking cases, on the assumption that
the former were controlled entirely by the guidelines while the latter were partly controlled by the statutes. Id. at 343. In some drug cases, a mandatory minimum statute
overrides, or "trumps," the otherwise applicable guideline and directly controls the
minimum prison term. But even in cases where the guideline range controls, the
statutes "affect" the sentence, because the guidelines were established based on an
extrapolation of the quantity thresholds and ratios among drugs found in the statutes. In some limited contexts it may be sensible to separate the effects of the guidelines from those of the statutes. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
SUPPLEMENTARY

REPORT

ON THE

INITIAL SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

AND

POLICY

STATEMENTS 70 fig. 2, 72 fig. 3 (1987) (showing increase in prison time served and
growth in prison populations for 15-year period, and separating the portion of
growth attributable to various statutes and to the guidelines); MCDONALD & CARLSON,
supra note 18, at tbl. 11.8 (analyzing average sentences for crack and powder cocaine
under alternative legal rules, including a rule in which sentences are based only on
the drug quantity levels mandated by the statutes without additional increases required by the guidelines). In the context of disparity research, however, isolating the
effects of the guidelines from the statutes may not be empirically possible or conceptually sensible. Further, because under our definition the guidelines determine the
full list of factors that are legally relevant, the biggest problem with sentences controlled by the statutes is that they involve unwarranted uniformity, not disparity.
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3. The Problem of Case ComparabilityBetween the Time Periods
If we measured disparity one way before guideline implementation and another way afterward, any differences between
the two time periods could arise from our use of a different
"ruler"-not from the guidelines changing the amount of disparity. One of the advantages of the "natural experiment"
methodology used in our analysis is that it consistently measures
the contribution of inter-judge differences to sentence variability in the total caseload in the pre- and post-implementation periods.
Matched-group comparisons have often been used to address this comparability problem. Similar cases in the two time
periods are identified, using the best data available. The
amount of variation in sentences among the matched groups is
calculated, and statistically significant differences are taken to
reflect the effect of the guidelines, since the cases are assumed
to be essentially identical. But this approach has several limitations. Matching procedures require difficult decisions about
how many factors, and which ones, should be used for the
matching. Using too few factors results in "matched" cases that
are not actually comparable. Using too many greatly reduces
the number of cases that are available for the analysis, since only
a few cases match on all the factors. Results are then based only
on a subset of cases that may not be representative of the entire
population.
Finally, the data available to create the matched groups may
be inadequate to form truly comparable groups. In the federal
courts, the switch to the guidelines was accompanied by the
creation of a new data collection system. These data files vary
somewhat in the variables collected and in their definitions, and
attempting to identify similar cases using these different datasets
is extremely difficult.8 6 Even if the data collection system remains constant, evaluators must be sensitive to possible changes
"sSee infra Part III.A (discussing the Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision
Information System (FPSSIS) and the Monitoring datasets). The FPSSIS data are
plagued by reliability problems. For the disparity study in its FOUR-YEAR EVALUATION,
the Sentencing Commission needed to recode case files and develop a specialized dat2set.
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in the meaning of the data. For example, if plea bargaining is
affected by the guidelines, offenders convicted of drug possession
may actually contain larger numbers of drug traffickers after
guideline implementation than before. Greater sentencing disparity among "possessors" after the guidelines are implemented
would not be due to the guidelines, but to a wider range of offense types resulting in conviction for "possession." 7
Three early evaluations of disparity reduction under the
federal guidelines illustrate the problems involved in creating
comparable groups. Theresa Walker Karle and Thomas Sager
compared cases sentenced between November 1, 1985, and October 31, 1987, to cases sentenced after November 1, 1987, in
three districts in the Fifth Circuit.," They found a statistically
significant reduction in variation in sentences imposed for ten
out of thirteen offense types, but they matched cases only on offense type, so other differences in the seriousness of the offenses or offenders between the two time periods were
uncontrolled. For example, the amount of drugs or criminal
history of defendants at the two time periods may have differed.
In addition, the "guidelines" group included nonguidelines
cases, since the cases were divided based on sentencing date,
not offense date.
Judge Gerald Heaney studied guideline and non-guideline
cases sentenced in 1989 in four districts in the Eighth Circuit.
He carefully reviewed the way that police, prosecutors, probation officers, and judges may introduce disparities in sentencing.89 The gap between the average sentences for AfricanAmericans and whites was larger for the guideline than for the
non-guideline cases. 90 However, these cases are not comparable

" For additional discussion and illustrations, see Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commission and Their Guidelines, in 17 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REViEw OF THE RESEARCH 137195 (Michael Tonry ed. 1993).
8 See Karle & Sager, supra note 77.
"See Heaney, supra note 79.
'Judge Heaney did not attempt to assess whether this gap was due to legally relevant or irrelevant factors. For other critiques of Judge Heaney's study, see Joe B.
Brown, The Sentencing Guidelines are Reducing Disparity, 29 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 875
(1992); Schulhofer, supra note 59; William W. Wilkins, Response tojudgeHeaney, 29 AM.
GRIM. L. REv. 795 (1992).
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because the non-guideline cases involved offenses that occurred
more than a year before sentencing (before November 1, 1987,
the effective date of the guidelines) while the guideline cases
involved offenses that had occurred since the guidelines became applicable. Thus, the guideline cases contained more offenses of the type that reach sentencing quickly, such as drug
trafficking, which are sentenced harshly and in which AfricanAmericans are more highly represented.
4. The Commission'sFour-YearEvaluation
The disparity study included in the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Four-Year Evaluation deserves more extended discussion because it represents the best pre/post matched group
comparison yet undertaken. Congress instructed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to conduct an evaluation of the Guidelines
four years after they were implemented. For this 1991 report,9 '
the Commission conducted several disparity-related studies but
featured a "Distributional Analysis," which compared bank robbery, cocaine distribution, heroin distribution, and bank embezzlement cases sentenced during fiscal year 1985 to cases
sentenced between January 19, 1989, and September 30, 1990.92
9'FouR-YEAR EVALUAnON, supra note 48. Because implementation of the guide-

lines was delayed in many jurisdictions due to constitutional challenges to the Sentencing Reform Act, the guidelines had been fully implemented only two-and-a-half
years at the time of the Commission's evaluation.
92 The Commission reported preliminary results from two other studies in the
"Disparity in Sentencing" chapter of its report. 'Judicial Sentencing Patterns under
the Guidelines" reported the location of sentences relative to the guideline range
(e.g., downward departure, bottom of the range, middle of the range, etc.) for four
groups of matched offenses and offenders. See id. at 300. Locations were compared
for offenders of various races, genders, and other demographic characteristics to assess whether unwarranted disparity might affect the choice of location. Inadequate
numbers, inconsistent findings, and statistically insignificant results led the Commission to conclude that "interpretation of any findings is difficult." See id. at 324. A
study of 'Judicial Discretion and Its Relationship to Disparity" reported on how the
guideline range was used for various offenses and offenders. Violent offenses were
sentenced at the top of the range more often than other offenses, economic offenses
were more often sentenced near the bottom of the range, and drug offenses were
more often below the range. Women were more frequently sentenced near the bottom of the range. No consistent pattern was discernable for race. Because these
analyses do not bear directly on inter-judge disparity, we discuss these studies no further in this report.
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Thus, only cases sentenced after the Supreme Court's decision
in Mistretta,which upheld the constitutionality of the guidelines
and led to their full, nationwide implementation, are included
in the post implementation sample.
Using FPSSIS data and original data collection from paper
case files, 93 offenders were matched on factors that the guidelines deem relevant to sentencing, including the approximate
amount of drugs, injury caused to any victims, the defendant's
role in the offense, criminal record, and whether the defendant
pleaded guilty or went to trial. Offenders who cooperated with
the government in the prosecution of other persons were excluded from the analysis, a decision that has been criticized by
some reviewers. 4 Because of the restricted number of crimes
and the requirement of matching, the number of defendants in
each comparison group ranged from small (e.g., thirteen preguideline bank robbers with weapons, seventeen without weapons) to moderate (eighty-one guideline cocaine traffickers).
For each defendant at each time period, the Commission
determined: (1) the sentence imposed by the judge at the sentencing hearing, and (2) the expected time that the defendant
"' TONRY, supra note 1, argued that data limitations and comparability problems
make the Commission's findings suspect. While it is true that the switch from FPSSIS
to the Commission's own monitoring data changed the definitions of some of the
variables needed for pre/post comparisons, Commission researchers went back to the
original paper records and recoded some data to ensure that data used to form the
matched groups were valid and reliable. While better data would always be desirable,
no fatal flaw in the data used to form the matched groups is apparent and the analyses conducted were performed only with data meeting acceptable standards of validity
and reliability.
" The Commission removed from pre-guidelines cases those in which the presentence report indicated that the defendant had cooperated with the government,
and from guideline cases those that involved departures based on "substantial assistance to the government." See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Matching defendants on whether
they cooperated is appropriate and necessary to create comparable groups. However,
as Michael Tonry has noted, substantial assistance motions are sometimes used to
avoid guideline sentences. The available data are inadequate to identify which defendants inappropriately received a substantial assistance departure. Since judges
have complete discretion within statutory limits once such a motion is granted, eliminating these cases may have artificially reduced the range of disparity in the guideline
sample. A possible alternative analysis-including all cooperating defendants in the
comparison groups-may be a better approach (although the portion of cooperating
defendants is probably higher in the guidelines group since the longer guideline sentences serve as an incentive for cooperation).
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would actually spend in prison, that is, the "expected time to be
served." For pre-guideline defendants, the expected time to be
served was calculated using an algorithm developed by the
Commission, which incorporated the presumptive parole release date, expected good-time deductions, and other factors
known to influence time served in the pre-guidelines era. This
resulted in the best available estimate of the date a defendant
could expect to be released provided that he or she maintained
good behavior while in prison. The expected time to be served
for guidelines defendants was the sentence imposed, less the
maximum 13% reduction for good behavior in prison that is
permitted by the Sentencing Reform Act. Thus, both expected
time-to-be-served measures were calculated based on a presumption of good behavior while in prison.
Comparisons of the distribution of sentences for each of the
matched groups demonstrated that the guidelines had reduced
disparity in sentences imposed. In every offense group, there
were large variations in sentences imposed in the pre-guidelines
period. And for every group, variation in sentences imposed
was reduced under the sentencing guidelines. Less variation
was found in expected time to be served in the pre-guidelines
era, and under the sentencing guidelines variation in time to be
served was similar to the pre-guideline period. In only three of
the eight matched groups was the reduction in variation of timeto-be-served statistically significant, although for all groups the
change was in the direction of less variation under the guidelines.
Several reviewers have cited only the results for expected
time-to-be-served and concluded that the evidence for the effectiveness of the guidelines is weak.95 Apparently, these reviewers
9DBUa Au ofJusTlcE ASSisTANCE, supra note 73, at 85 ("The fact that only three of
the offense categories showed statistically significant reductions in disparity suggests
that pre-guidelines cases were already exhibiting a relatively high degree of uniformity in court disposition. Further declines in sentencing disparity might have occurred
independently of the introduction of guidelines and may be the product of

chance."); MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 18, at 32; Rhodes, supra note 7, at 155
(criticizing use of an expected time to be served measure that incorporated the presumptive parole date because it "may not correspond closely with the prison time actually served prior to the guidelines. This may render the comparisons of time served
inaccurate").
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believe the only meaningful comparison is between time served
under the guidelines and time served in the pre-guidelines era.
However, we think it counts as success if the guidelines achieved
truth-in-sentencing while maintaining at least the same uniformity in time served that had previously been achieved through parole guidelines. The goal of the parole guidelines was clearly
the same as the sentencing guidelines-reducing unwarranted
disparity-and by most accounts, they were a success.9 Indeed,
the parole guidelines provided the model for the sentencing
guidelines. We believe that the findings from the Four-Year
Evaluation suggest that the guidelines achieved truth-insentencing while decreasing disparity in sentences imposed and
maintaining or increasing the uniformity in time to be served
that had previously been obtained under the parole guidelines.
The Commission concluded, and perhaps overstated, its belief that the Four-YearEvaluationdemonstrated that unwarranted
disparity was reduced by the guidelines.97 In any event, the
Commission's self-evaluation was met with considerable skepticism. At the request of Congress, the GAO reanalyzed the data
on cocaine and heroin offenses, using somewhat different techniques, and also conducted additional tests."' Their analyses
replicated and confirmed the Commission's basic findings, yet
they decided that there was insufficient evidence to conclude
' Michael L Gottfredson, Parole Guidelines and the Reduction of Sentencing Disparity,
16J. REs. CmmE & DEINQ. 49 (1979) (reporting that data strongly suggest a considerable reduction in disparity when examining time served compared to sentence imposed and, when read in light of other research, imply that this reduction is a result
of the federal parole guidelines).
'7 David Weisburd points out that the Commission overstated its results in its
summary of findings in the report. See David Weisburd, 5 FED. SENTENcING REP. 150
(1992). The text of the Commission's report says that disparity had been reduced for
cocaine and heroin offenses both in terms of sentence imposed and time to be
served. See FOUR-YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 48, at 299. But since the findings for
time-to-be-served were not statistically significant, the possibility that they were due to
chance cannot be eliminated, even though the variances were reduced under the
guidelines. Weisburd, supra.
9GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 58-59. The GAO's analysis involved all heroin and
cocaine distributors in Criminal History Category I. The GAO also conducted additional analyses aimed at determining whether legally irrelevant characteristics such as
race and gender were affecting sentences under the guidelines. See id. apps. II & 111.
Since these studies do not bear on whether interjudge disparity has been reduced
from the pre-guidelines era, we will not discuss them here.
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that the guidelines had reduced disparity." Subsequent reviewers have reached the same judgment. Several criticisms that
seem to us incorrect have been discussed in previous footnotes
and in the discussion that follows. However, several other
methodological problems qualify our confidence in the FourYear Evaluationfindings and suggest the need for additional research to complement the matched-group approach.
First, several reviewers have argued that small sample sizes
make the Commission's findings suspect.0 0 In its review, the
GAO noted that because only cases that were part of narrowlydefined matched groups were studied, only 479 of the 25,940
cases sentenced in FY1990 were analyzed. Six of the matched
groups involved fewer than 30 cases and none was larger than
81. But in fact, small sample sizes make it more difficult to get
statistically significant results. The reductions in variances for
sentences imposed were statistically significant in the Commission's study because the effect'sizes--the amount of reductionswere very large. For example, for weaponless bank robbers who
had prior convictions, the range of months between sentences
at the 10th and 90th percentiles fell from 138 months in the
pre-guidelines era to 26 months under the guidelines. For heroin distributors without a criminal history, the range fell from
78 months to 28 months. Precisely because the reduction in
variance was so large, the Commission was able to achieve statistically significant results with relatively small sample sizes.
The problem with the Commission's analysis, it seems to us,
is not the size of the samples but their representativeness. What
can we learn about the overall effectiveness of the guidelines in
reducing disparity by examining eight groups of offenders guilty
of four types of crimes? The Commission viewed the four
crimes as broadly representative of federal offenses, since they
"I leL at 10. ("[L] imitations and inconsistencies in the data available for pre-guidelines and guidelines offenders made it impossible to determine how effective the sentencing guidelines have been in reducing overall sentencing disparity."). The Commission disagreed with the GAO's conclusion, which was reflected in the subtitle of
the GAO report "Central Questions Remain Unanswered." Instead, the Commission
argued that the research justified a different conclusion as noted in "Disparity Reduced, But Some Questions Remain." See id. app. VI, at 182.
- See TONRY, supranote 1, at 47.
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included one "street" crime, one "white collar" crime, and two
drug crimes. But we and others have been less convinced.101
One more problem mars the Four-Year Evaluation. In the

pre-guideline era, judges anticipated that the time imposed
would be reduced by one- to two-thirds through parole release.
Accordingly, they imposed longer sentences for some offenses
than are required by the guidelines. Several of the groups in
the Commission's study showed significant reductions in the
lengths of sentences imposed. Variances in sentence imposed
would be smaller for these crimes under the guidelines simply
because the sentences are shorter and the range of sentences
narrower, even without any reduction in unwarranted disparity.
The GAO appears to have recognized this problem and addressed it through use of a "coefficient of variation." Unfortunately, this part of the GAO study is flawed on other grounds.102
To make meaningful comparisons, an adjustment in the measure of variation is needed to allow for changes in the lengths of
sentences imposed in the guideline era.
Several of the limitations of the Commission's matched
group comparisons could be overcome.10 3 However, given the

trade-off between creating precisely defined groups and creating groups of sufficient size for meaningful statistical comparison, some loss of representativeness is inevitable. Problems
inherent with matched-group research designs convince us that
we cannot rely on their findings alone to conclude that the

01 Weisburd,

supra note 97, at 151 ("[T]he restricted samples employed by the

Commission make it very difficult to generalize broadly from their findings.").
02 The "coefficient of variation" adjusts the measure of dispersion to account for
differences in the average sentences at the two time periods. It appears to have been
used in the analysis, reported in Appendix I of the GAO Report. GAO REPORT, supra
note 9. However, this analysis matched offenders on criteria that were too general.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Simple comparisons of standard deviations
appear to have been used in the other replication of the Commission's analysis.
"" Using more recent guidelines data, a reanalysis could: (1) create as many
matched groups as possible; (2) compare groups both including and excluding cooperating defendants; (3) exclude cases where mandatory minimum statutes truncate
the range (or use the guideline sentence in such cases) to ensure that any reduction
in variation is not due to these statutes; and (4) compare coefficients of variation or
some other measure of variation that takes account of differing lengths of sentences
at the two time periods.
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guidelines have been either a failure or a success. °4 A different
method that does not require elimination of so many types of
offenses is needed.
Statistical control has been proposed as one alternative to
matched-group comparisons.10' It requires researchers to measure characteristics at the two time periods, but instead of using
these data to match cases, it uses them to estimate the contribution of each characteristic to the final sentences. These contributions are then removed from the sentences and the "residual"
variation that remains is examined to see if it has changed. In
this way, differences between the types of cases at the two times
are "controlled for" statistically. This method also has probstudying
lems, however, that we believe limit its usefulness 10for
6
the effect of the guidelines on interjudge disparity.

B. USING RANDOMIZATION TO CREATE COMPARABILITY

The comparability problem has been called "insunnountable." 7 The GAO ultimately concluded that because of limitations in the data, such research would never yield definitive
answers as to whether the guidelines had been effective at reducing unwarranted disparity. It recommended that attempts at
pre/post comparisons in the federal system be ended.0 8 But
given the importance of the policy issue involved, we believe it is
premature to abandon these efforts, especially since matching is
not the only means of achieving the comparability needed for
pre/post evaluations.
" For other reviews of these studies, see BUREAu OFJuSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note
73, at 84-89; McDoNALD & CARLSON, supra note 18, at 26-35; Michael Tonry, The Failure of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,39 CRIME & DELINQ. 131 (1993).
105William Rhodes, Sentence Disparity, Use of Incarceration,and Plea Bargaining: The
Post-Guideline View from the Commission, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 153 (1992).
"6These problems include uncertainty about how variance shared by several characteristics should be apportioned, which can confound comparisons if the prevalence
of these interrelated factors differs between the two time periods. In addition, removing the contribution of various factors introduces the possibility of systematic error
into the residual variance if the form of the relationship between the factors and the
outcome is misspecified.
107 SeeTONRY, supra note 1, at 47.
108 Id. at 24 ("As a practical matter, it is not possible to rectify the shortcomings of
the pre-guidelines data to develop a more meaningful baseline for comparing sentencing outcomes before and after the guidelines .. ").
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In much scientific research, comparisons are made not between individuals, but between averages of comparable groups
using random assignment to ensure comparability between the
groups. For example, researchers assessing the effect of a
treatment, such as a new drug for high cholesterol, administer
the drug to an experimental group and to a control group.
Subjects are randomly assigned to the two groups. There is no
need that the individualsin the two groups be similar; we know
that they will vary in pre-treatment cholesterol. By using random assignment, in the long run these differences are evenly
distributed across the groups and the average pre-treatment average cholesterol levels will be fairly similar between the groups.
The laws of probability guarantee certain things. First, the
larger the size of the groups, the more similar their average cholesterol levels will be. We recognize intuitively that in larger
groups, the effects of extremely high or low levels on the group
average will be attenuated. Second, based on the size of the
groups and the amount of variation among individuals within
them, we can determine how much difference in group averages is expected by chance, that is, due to the random assignment.
With twenty persons in each group, it may be quite common for
the average of two randomly created groups to differ by ten
points. It would be extremely unlikely, however, for their difference to be 80 points. If we find an 80-point difference after
the experimental group has undergone treatment, then we are
safe to conclude that it was the treatment, and not any preexisting differences among the individuals in each group, that
accounts for at least some of the difference.
Statistical "hypothesis testing"-the bread and butter of scientific research-applies these laws of probability to real-world
data. Statisticians calculate the probability that any observed
difference might be due to the random assignment instead of
some other difference between the groups. If the experimental
group's average score is so much different that it would arise
from random assignment less than five times in 100, the difference is said to be "statistically significant" at the .05 probability
level.
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Random assignment plays a role in legal procedures as well
as in experimental research. In most federal courts, judges in
the same location are assigned cases randomly to prevent 'judge
shopping" and to help ensure fair procedures. This creates a
"natural experiment" that permits us to assess how judges influence sentences. Judges are like treatments. We know from the
laws of probability the differences in average sentences that we
can expect by chance among judges who are part of the same
random assignment pool. If the observed differences are larger
than this, we can infer that it is something about the judgesmost likely differences in sentencing philosophies-that
explains some of the differences. It is notjust differences in the
types of cases sentenced.
Capitalizing on this natural experiment avoids perplexing
questions about how to match offenders and permits us to study
a much larger number of sentences, not only the small number
that meet a matching criteria. We pay a price, however. We
study differences in averages among judges, not differences in
sentences imposed on identical or similar cases. Our focus becomes the "primary judge effect"-overall differences among
judges in leniency or severity-not the amount of variation imposed on a particular type of case. How this approach complements simulation studies and matched-group comparisons will
be discussed further after presentation of our results.
1. Waldfogel's Study of Three Cities
The natural experiment methodology was first used to study
the effects of the sentencing guidelines in a pilot study by
economistJoel Waldfogel published in December 1991.1" He
studied two time periods-pre-guideline sentencing from 1984
until 1987, and a transitional period from 1988 until 1990,
which contains a mix of both guideline and non-guideline
cases-in the Southern District of New York, the District of
Connecticut, and the Northern District of California. First, he
established through interviews and statistical tests that the cases
were randomly assigned. Then he compared the average sen'" Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing:Evidence from
ThreeDistricts,4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 151 (1991).
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tences among judges who had been at each location at both periods, using "mean absolute deviation" as the measure of interjudge disparity. He found statistically significant differences
among judges (which he called aggregate interjudge disparity)
at all locations prior to the guidelines. In the transitional period, Connecticut and New York continued to show significant
differences among judges."0
Waldfogel's approach is promising, but his results are problematic for several reasons. First, the transitional period he
studied was very early in guideline implementation, therefore
the full effect of the new system was not realized. Second, any
effect of the guidelines is "watered down" by the inclusion of a
large proportion of non-guideline cases in the transitional
group. Third, because he was forced to hand code data from
court files in the various districts, he was able to include only
three districts, which may not be representative of the nationwide effects of the guidelines."' Finally, Waldfogel's measure of
inter-judge disparity-mean absolute deviation-suffers from
the same problem as the Commission's use of variance in its
study of the dispersion of sentences among matched groups: it
does not take into account overall changes in the lengths
of sen2
tences for some types of crimes under the guidelines.1
"0 Waldfogel used a simple measure to compare the amount of inter-judge disparity before guideline implementation and during the transition. He calculated the
number of months that the average sentence of each judge differed from the overall
average sentence at each location. The average of these differences was the "mean
absolute deviation" for a city. He found that the degree of inter-judge disparity in
Connecticut and New York had actually increased, but it had remained the same in
the Northern District of California. For the period 1984-1987, the mean deviations in
months were 4.2, 5.8, and 4.2 for, respectively, New Haven, Manhattan, and San
Francisco. For the period 1988-1990, the means were 9.9, 10.4, and 4.4. Id. at 152.
. Hand coding was necessary, despite the existence of computerized records, because of a long-standing policy of theJudicial Conference of the United States against
releasing computer records with judge identifiers included.
"2 We replicated Waldfogel's work using our data but computing both his "mean
absolute deviation" and R-squared, the measure of interjudge disparity that we ultimately chose for our analysis. (Two of the cities used by Waldfogel did not meet our
criteria for random assignment, and were excluded from our later analyses.) Our
conclusions were the same as his when we calculated "mean absolute deviations."
However, when we used R-squared, disparity decreased under the guidelines in all
three cities. This contradiction arises from mathematical differences between the
measures. Variances are sensitive to extreme differences because they are calculated
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2. Payne's Study of Three Cities
In 1997, A. Abigail Payne published a replication and expansion of Waldfogel's approach.11 3 Data were obtained for felony cases initiated by grand jury indictment between 1980 and
1991. This was supplemented with judge information obtained
from the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (SDNY
and EDNY) and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (EDPA).
Only drug trafficking cases or cases involving embezzlement,
fraud, or theft (the EFT cases) were studied. 14 Payne found that
since implementation of the guidelines, sentences have grown
somewhat longer for EFT cases and substantially longer for drug
cases. She also reported that under the guidelines, more defendants are pleading guilty at their initial appearance, rather
than at a subsequent hearing." 5
To study inter-judge disparity, Payne conducted several statistical analyses for each city, separating the drug cases from the
EFT cases. First, she examined differences among judges in the
proportion of cases receiving a term of imprisonment. Results
varied depending on the type of case and the district. Second,
regression analyses were performed for each type of case in
each city. These analyses measured the proportion of variance
in sentences that could be attributed to (1) the specific type of
offense, (2) the year the case was sentenced, and (3) differences
among judges. (The latter is a measure of inter-judge disparity
similar to that which we use for our analysis, and is discussed in
by squaring each judge's average sentence subtracted from the overall average for his
or her city, thus giving more weight to judges who are farther from the norm. If the
guidelines were effective at moving a few extreme judges closer to the norm, the Rsquared could shrink even if more judges moved slightly farther from their city's average. Variance is the most widely accepted measure of dispersion when extreme
outliers do not skew the distributions of interest. Given the results of our tests of
normality, reported below, we chose to use variance rather than mean absolute difference.
'"Payne, supranote 85.
"' See discussion of the logic of using these case types to isolate the effects of the
guidelines, supranote 85.
..This suggests that pre-indictment plea negotiations are more common under
the guidelines. Payne also states that cases are not assigned to judges until after the
defendant enters a plea. Payne, supra note 85, app. B at 359. This is not consistent
with our understanding of the case assignment process in most districts, where cases
are assigned to judges when they are filed.
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detail in later sections.) Payne found an increase in disparity in
all cities in EFT cases and inconsistent results among cities in
drug cases. A measure of the statistical significance of the differences among judges yielded inconsistent results among cities
in EFT cases but suggested uniform improvement in drug
cases.11 6 Finally, a non-parametric test of differences among
judges in median sentence suggested a limited effect for the
guidelines in EFT cases and modest or no effect in drug cases.
Payne concluded from the inconsistent results of these analyses
that the amount of inter-judge disparity was never very great,
but that the guidelines appeared to have reduced it in some, but
not all, of the district courts studied.
The mixed results suggest that the effects of the guidelines
on disparity are not the same in all places and with all types of
cases-a finding that we replicate with our analyses. Several
limitations in Payne's approach, however, suggest that a more
powerful analysis may yield more robust and consistent findings.
First, like Waldfogel, Payne used data from a transitional period,
which included many non-guideline cases mixed with cases sentenced under the guidelines, thus diluting any effect of the
guidelines. Second, because data were available only for three
districts, four case types, and judges who sentenced both before
and after the guidelines, the generalizability of the findings is
limited.
Most important, the statistical analysis used by Payne to determine the proportion of variance in sentence lengths attributable to judges does not appear to be the most powerful model
possible. A combined model treating judges as nested within
cities is superior, and permits us to obtain an inter-city as well as
inter-judge effect."' Further, Payne tested for differences in average sentences-the primary judge effect-but did not measure or discuss the interaction effect of judges with case type,
which we know from previous research may be a more powerful
influence on sentence disparity than the primary judge effect.
""Payne does not discuss the influence of variations in sample sizes on the results
of the F test. See infra Part III.B (discussing our use of the F-test).
17

Payne, supranote 85, at 357.

"1See infra Part III.B (discussing our statistical model).
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Given the promise of the natural experiment methodology
but the limitations of Waldfogel's and Payne's studies, we set out
to extend their work by (1) using more recent data that strictly
separated guideline from pre-guideline cases in as many cities,
and with as many judges, as possible, and (2) using a more
complete statistical model. 9
11.

A NEW ANALYSIS USING THE NATURAL EXPERIMENT APPROACH

The basic logic of the analyses conducted for our study is to
compare the amount of interjudge disparity before and after
guideline implementation. Interjudge disparity is defined as
differences in average sentences among judges who receive
comparable caseloads. Thus, we are measuring the primary
judge effect-the general tendency ofjudges to be more lenient
or severe than their colleagues. We recognize that this measures only the "tip of the iceberg" of disparity created by judges,
because it fails to account for interaction effects between judges
and particular offense and offender characteristics. 120 We believe, however, that this measure provides a useful barometer of
the success of the guidelines. The statistical model we developed allows us to aggregate the amount of inter-judge disparity
across different cities while comparing each judge only to other
judges in the same city. In addition, the statistical model will
test whether the differences we find might be due to differences
in caseloads arising from the random assignment and not due
to differences in the judges' sentencing decisions.

a preliminary report of another attempt to extend Waldfogel and Payne's
"9For
natural experiment methodology, see STrr & CABRANES, supra note 43, at 122. These
authors' initial findings appear to support Payne's conclusion that the guidelines
have had some modest success at reducing inter-judge disparity, at least in some cities
and for some types of cases.
120 See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the primary judge effect and interaction effects).
A recent analysis by Joel Waldfogel further demonstrated the importance of the interaction effects. See supra Part U.B.1. Using real data from the pre-guideline era in

the Northern District of California, he found that the primary judge effect accounted
for only 2.3% of the variation in sentences, but that an additional 9% was due to
these interactions, which is another aspect of inter-judge disparity. The significance
of our findings concerning the primary judge effect is further discussed in the final
section of this article. See infra Part IV.A.
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The Technical Appendix provides greater detail on the databases, definition of variables, statistical model, and computer
programs used for this study.
A. SAMPLE SELECTION

Our data came from two sources: (1) the 1984 and 1985
Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System (FPSSIS) and (2) the fiscal years 1994 and 1995 U.S. Sentencing Commission Monitoring data file. We used two-year
time frames for both periods to reduce the possibility that
unique case assignments would interfere with random assignment. Only felony convictions were included in the analyses.'
Federal district courts include active judges, who hear full
caseloads and to whom cases are randomly assigned, and senior
judges, who have smaller caseloads and who may be selective
about the kinds of cases they hear. Because the caseloads of
judges on senior status are systematically different from those of
active judges, we checked the Federal Reporter 22 for each year
to identify which judges were active and excluded senior judges
from our analyses. Because no inter-judge comparisons are possible in jurisdictions where only one judge is present at either of
our time periods, these locations were also eliminated from our
analyses. Further, to reduce the likelihood of systematic case selection that might arise if only two judges are present in a
courthouse, we used the nine cities that had at least three or
more judges who were active at both time periods.
From these locations we further eliminated those where
random case assignment could not be confirmed. Because ensuring random assignment is important to the logic of our
analysis, we describe our test for randomness in detail in the
121 Our

datasets contain only offenders who were convicted and sentenced. We do

not include defendants whose cases were dismissed before conviction or who were
acquitted at trial. Since it is case filings, not convictions, that are randomly assigned
to judges, some non-comparability in the sentenced caseloads could emerge ifjudges
differed in their dismissal or acquittal rates. Analysis by other researchers of data on
all filed cases suggest that differences in dismissal and acquittal rates do exist among
judges, but that they are negligible and appear unlikely to explain differences in sentences. Interview with Jeffrey R. Kling, National Bureau of Economic Research (Dec.
9, 1997).
'"'FEDERAL REPORTER, Ser. 2, West Publishing.
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Technical Appendix. Applying all these selection criteria left us
with forty-one cities, containing 254 judges in 1984-1985 and
301 judges in 1994-1995. Nine cities had the same three or
more judges active at both time periods, which were used for
within-judge analyses.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF A STATISTICAL MODEL

To compare differences among judges before and after
guideline implementation, we conducted a series of multivariate
analyses. Sentence length imposed by the judge was considered
the outcome, or dependent, variable in the statistical model.
Several legal and extra-legal factors were included in the model
as explanatory, or independent, variables. Most important was
the sentencing judge. Because we wanted to compare each
judge's sentences only with those of other judges in the same
random assignment pool, each judge was treated as "nested"
within his or her city and compared only to other judges with
comparable caseloads. We also examined the effects of the city
in which the case was decided. When interpreting results, remember that cases were not randomly assigned to cities. Any
city effect found may reflect unmeasured differences in the
types of cases prosecuted in different cities, as well as differences in regional philosophies and sentencing traditions.
In addition to judge and city, the influence of general offense type and criminal history was considered. Because we
wanted the results from the two time periods to be strictly comparable, we used only variables that could be measured the
same way in the two datasets. Offenses were categorized into
seven general types. Offenders were categorized into two
criminal history groups-those with and those without any previous convictions. In 1984-1985, 51% of the defendants had no
prior criminal record; in 1994-1995, 48% had none.
We structured the model so that offense type and criminal
history were "credited" with explaining as much variation in
sentences as possible. Judges were treated as nested within their
city and the judge effect was assessed after variation in sentences
due to all other explanatory variables had been removed. Because cases were randomly assigned (thus assuring no correlation between case characteristics and judges within each city)
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the judge effect can be interpreted unambiguously as the independent influence ofjudges on sentences. 123
The statistical significance of each of the explanatory factors
was tested with an F-test. Of greatest interest was the effect of
judges. The F-test for this factor calculated the probability that
any observed differences among judges might be due to differences in their caseload from random assignment rather than to
differences in their sentencing decisions. We reported differences as statistically significant only if the result yields a p-level
of .05 or smaller, indicating that the observed difference would
be expected to arise from random assignment less than one
time in twenty.
The magnitude of the influence of each of the explanatory
factors was measured with the R-squared-the proportion of
variance in sentences accounted for by the factor. R-squared
measured the effect of a factor as a percentage of the total variance in sentences at a given time period. Unlike the measures
used in the Commission's Four-YearEvaluationand by Waldfogel,
the R-squared measured inter-judge disparity as a proportion of
the total variation at a given time period, whatever the absolute
total may be. In discussing R-squared, we converted it to a percentage-the percentage of the total variance in sentences that
can be uniquely attributed to judges.
If the guidelines have been effective at reducing inter-judge
disparity, the percentage of variation attributable to judges
should be smaller after guideline implementation than before.
We subtracted the percentage obtained in 1994-1995 from the
percentage in 1984-1985. The size of this difference measures
the magnitude of the change, the sign of the difference measures the direction: positive indicates an increase in, and negative indicates a decrease in disparity. Thus, we have two general
approaches to examining differences among judges and between the two time periods. The F-test assesses the statistical
significance of differences among judges in a city. The propor-

'" See infra Technical Appendix for a discussion of how the nesting of judges
within cities means that some of the effect of varying judicial philosophies may be
confounded with the city effect.
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tion of variance accounted for by judges assesses the meaningfulness of these differences.
C. RESULTS OF A NATIONWIDE ANALYSIS

1. ComparisonsAmong the SameJudgesBefore and After Guideline
Implementation
The most straightforward way to assess the effect of the

guidelines is to compare sentences ofjudges who sentenced before the guidelines and under them. Unfortunately, because
ten years separates the two time periods-during which many
judges retired and new judges came on the bench-only nine
qualifying cities have at least three judges who were sentencing
at both times. This makes forty-two judges available for comparison. Unlike the analysis in the next section involving differentjudges, the mix of Republicans and Democrats, liberals and
conservatives, and women and men in this analysis are largely
the same at the two time periods because the judges are the

same judges. Differences in disparity at the two times are most
changes.124
likely due to policy changes and not to personnel

Table 1 displays results of this within-judge analysis for sentences imposed.'2 Only defendants convicted of offenses with
at least 1,000 cases at both time periods are included-namely
drugs, firearms, fraud, immigration, larceny, robbery, and

'2 Research has shown, however, that judicial attitudes do change with experience
on the bench, generally in the direction of more severe sentences. In addition, experience on the bench exposes judges to a larger number and wider range of offenders
and provides more opportunity to learn about the sentencing behavior of colleagues.
Thus, some decrease in inter-judge disparity might be expected over the decade of
our comparison, even without the introduction of sentencing guidelines. As shown
by comparison with the later analyses of all judges, disparity among these judges decreased somewhat more than among judges in general. However, both groups show
an aggregate decrease in disparity over the decade of our study.
5 Analyses were also performed for estimated time-to-be-served, using the algo..
rithms described in the Technical Appendix. As expected, before the guidelines
judges had less influence over time served than over sentence imposed. This reflects
the effect of the parole release decisions, which were made pursuant to parole guidelines that were designed in part to correct disparities in sentences imposed. Under
the sentencing guidelines, time served is a direct reflection of sentence imposed and
judges' influence on both is the same.
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other. 126 Additional analyses were conducted using all offense
types and the pattern of findings was essentially the same.
The top line gives the percentage of variation accounted for
by the complete model, i.e., all of our factors combined: 34.68%
in the pre-guideline era and 38.93% under the guidelines. In
the middle of the table, we see that offense type explains by far
the largest share of variation in sentences, both in the preguidelines era and under the guidelines. About a fifth of the
variation in sentences is accounted for by the general type of offense being sentenced. Criminal history, somewhat surprisingly,
explains much less. Recall that we categorized offenders into
only two groups: first time offenders and those with any criminal
history.
On the second line of the table we see the finding that directly concerns inter-judge disparity-the primary judge effect.
In the pre-guidelines era, 2.32% of the variation in sentences
was explained by differences among judges. Under the guidelines, this drops to 1.24%. As shown in the column on the right,
this represents a reduction of 1.08%. The effect ofjudges is statistically significant at both time periods, but it is reduced almost by half under the guidelines. These findings indicate that
the guidelines, while not eliminating all inter-judge disparity,
have had a positive effect.
To get a better sense of what these effects mean, we translated the percentages into actual months of imprisonment,
which are shown in separate columns on the table. 27 The
2.32% of variance in sentences imposed attributed to judges in
1994-1995 means that, on average across all cases and judges,
defendants can expect their sentences to be about 7.87 months
longer or shorter solely due to the particular judge to which
they are assigned. This is, of course, an average across alljudges
and some judges may be more extreme than the average
"' We limited analyses to these offense types because this number is needed to
permit calculation of interaction terms, as reported at the bottom of Table 1 and discussed in the next section.
12 We translated the effect size into actual months of imprisonment by (1) multiplying the total variance by the portion of the variance accounted for by judges, and
(2) finding the square root of the result, thus translating the numbers back into absolute terms.
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TABLE 1.
PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCE EXPLAINED (IN MONTHS)
BYJUDGE AND OTHER FACTORS A
Combined Analyses in Cities with the Same Three (or More) Judges in Both Time
Periods

PRE-GuiDEnNE (1984/1985)
Variable Group

Months

"R-Square"

Model
Judge

30.43
7.87

34.68
2.32

City
Offense Type
Criminal History

5.24
22.33
9.95

1.03
18.66

Offense Type * City
Offense Type * Judge (City)

10.09
11.73

3.81
5.15

POST-GUIDELINE (1994/1995)
Months

"R-Square"

42.65

38.93

Judge
City
Offense Type

7.61
12.94
30.69

1.24
3.59

Criminal History
Offense Type * City
Offense Type *Judge (City)

10.50
14.74
18.00

Variable Group
Model

3.70

20.16
2.36
4.65
6.94

PRE/POST DnFRENcE

Variable Group
Model
Judge
City
Offense Type
Criminal History

Months

"R-Square"

12.22
-0.26

4.25
-1.08
2.56
1.50
1.34

7.70
8.36
0.55

Offense Type * City
4.65
0.84
Offense Type *Judge (City)
6.27
1.79
7 Cases were assigned randomly amongjudges in each city, but not
among cities.
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suggests. Under the guidelines, the judge effect, as a percentage of variation, is shorter. But because sentences have gotten
longer in the guideline era, judges' influence in absolute terms
remains almost the same-7.61 months.
The findings on the effect of cities are much less encouraging, but also harder to interpret. Under the guidelines, the city
in which one is sentenced appears to have a greater effect than
it did in the pre-guideline era, rising from 1.03% to 3.59%. Because cases are not randomly assigned to cities, we cannot know
whether this reflects a growth of inter-regional disparities or reflects some growing difference in the caseloads of various cities
that is not captured by our general measures of offense type and
criminal history. As discussed further below, there are reasons
to believe it may be both.
2. ComparisonsAmong Alljudges
The possibility that a changing mix of viewpoints on the
bench accounts for changes in interjudge disparity is limited by
the samejudge analysis presented above. However, it also limits
the number ofjudges and cases available for study. Two citiesNew York and Los Angeles-together account for almost half
the judges in the nine-cities analysis. To see if the results from
the nine cities generalized to the system as a whole, we examined all cities that had three or more active judges during both
of the two time periods, regardless of whether some or any of
the judges were the same at both times. Forty-one cities met this
criterion.
Table 2 displays the results of this analysis. The overall pattern is similar to the results using only nine cities. Offense type
continues to be the greatest influence on sentences. Criminal
history remains significant but small. But it appears that as we
include more cities in the analysis, a greater range of differences among them emerges. The city effect grows from 1.81%
in the pre-guidelines era to 5.64% under the guidelines.
The influence of judges on the sentence imposed is significant at both time periods-2.40% in the pre-guidelines era and
1.64% under the guidelines, a reduction of .76%. Because we
are comparing different judges, we cannot interpret these
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TABLE 2.
PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCE EXPLAINED (IN MONTHS)
BYJUDGE AND OTHER FACTrORS
All CitiesB
PRE-GUIDEUNE (1984/1985)
Months

"R-Square"

33.26

33.76

8.89
7.70

2.40
1.81

Offense Type
Criminal History
Offense Type * City

23.21
10.05
11.41

16.44
3.08
3.97

Offense Type *Judge (City)

14.07

6.04

POST-GUDEINE (1994/1995)
Months

"R-Square"

Model
Judge
City

46.40
9.69
17.97

37.64
1.64
5.64

Offense Type
Criminal History
Offense Type * City
Offense Type *Judge (City)

31.00
14.56
16.98
16.58

16.80

Variable Group
Model
Judge
City

Variable Group

Variable Group

PE/POST DDFEENCE
Months

Model
Judge
City
Offense Type
Criminal History
Offense Type * City
Offense Type *Judge (City)

13.14
0.80
10.27
7.79
4.51
5.57
2.51

3.70
5.04
4.80

"R-Square"
3.88
-0.76
3.83
0.36
0.62
1.07
-1.24

Cases were assigned randomly amongjudges in each city, but not among cities.
cities included in this analysis are those which pass the two statistical
tests of
randomness described in Appendix A.
BThe
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results as an unambiguous effect of the guidelines. In general,
however, the guidelines appear to have had modest success at
reducing inter-judge disparity. But in this forty-four-cities analysis the effect of the guidelines appears more limited and differences among cities appear more important. The findings
suggest the need for more fine-grained analysis of how sentencing is affected by the guidelines in different cities.
The last two lines on Tables 1 and 2 display interaction effects. The offense type by judge interaction effect measures
whether the relative leniency or severity of a judge depends on
the type of crime being sentenced. Because judges are nested
within cities, the offense type by city interaction was also determined. 2 8 All the interactions were statistically significant and
accounted for sizeable portions of variance. These effects suggest the need for more fine-grained analyses of how the guidelines have affected different judges' sentencing of different
types of crimes.
Recall that the simulation studies reviewed in Part I found
that sentences were influenced by ajudge's overall tendency toward leniency or severity-the primary judge effect-but even
more by disagreements among judges over the appropriate sentence for particular types of cases. For example, ajudge may be
on average four months more lenient than the average for his
or her city. But if there is an interaction effect, the judge may
be eight months more lenient for fraud cases, but only two
months more lenient for drug trafficking. In fact, some judges
may be more lenient than their colleagues in some types of
cases but more harsh in others.
Examination of changes in the interaction effects between
the two time periods reveals no consistent pattern between the
nine-cities and forty-four-cities analyses. The offense type by city
interaction went up in both analyses. The offense type by judge
interaction went up in the nine-cities analyses and down in the
'2'

Technically, the offense type by city interaction is above the offense type by

judge (nested within city) interaction in the hierarchy of effects. The variance associated with offense type by city is partialled out of the dependent variable before the
offense type by judge effect is determined. See HAROLD R. LzNMAN, ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE IN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 204 (1992).
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forty-one-cities analysis. The presence of significant interactions
and the lack of a consistent pattern suggest the need to examine
different offense types separately.
D. RESULTS OF DISAGGREGATED ANALYSES

Researchers studying the guidelines have issued a warning:
"the trees may be more significant than the forest."'
Rand
Corporation researcher Terence Dunworth and law professor
Charles Weisselberg studied the impact of the guidelines on felony sentencing and reached the basic conclusion that the
guidelines do not affect all case types and all districts equally.'
It is extremely difficult, and perhaps, unhelpful, to draw general,
system-wide, conclusions about the effect of the guidelines upon the district courts. A showing that different districts and cases are subject to
different stresses is, in itself, significant, because it suggests that the
guidelines mean different things in different contexts.131

We used several methods to test the hypothesis that the effects of the guidelines vary for different offense types and in different cities. Because the number of cases available for analysis
drops dramatically when we disaggregate national caseloads into
specific offenses in specific locations, it becomes difficult to
achieve statistical significance and power with every desired
comparison. But the results provide examples that support the
hypothesis that the effect of the guidelines is not uniform across
all offense types and places.
1. FindingsforDifferent Offense Types
Table 3 shows the effect of judge and other factors on sentences imposed for various offenses. Because we are modeling
the influences on each offense separately, offense type is not a
factor and there are no interaction terms. The number of cases
available for each offense is relatively small and some effects

29 Charles

D. Weisselberg & Terence Dunworth, Inter-District Variation Under the

Guidelines: The Trees May Be More Significant Than the Forest, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 25

(1993).
...
Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal Courts:
The GuidelinesExperience, 66 So. CAL. L. REV.99 (1992).
"' Weisselberg & Dunworth, supra note 129, at 27.
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TABLE 3.
PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCE IN SENTENCE IMPOSED EXPLAINED BY
JUDGES AND OTHER FACTORS
All Cities
Variable Group

PRE-GUIDEL NE (1984/1985)
Drug Fraud Immig. Robbery

Firearm

Larceny

39.96
5.72
0.85

29.58
0.58
1.15

29.96
4.78
1.40

18.00

14.14

Criminal History
Race

0.85
0.45

3.14
0.91

Gender
Age
Judge

1.44
1.60

0.84
0.061

0.74
0.131

1.10
1.11

0.251
0.141

7.47

6.90

5.89

15.80

18.081

16.16

City

6.20

2.29

13.10

14.38

9.37

6.37

Variable Group

POST-GUIDELINE (1994/1995)
Fraud Imniig. Robbery
Drug

Firearm

Larceny

Model

26.50

14.83

40.82

36.06

30.11

28.08

3.76
3.60

2.95
0.62

15.08
1.16

2.77
2.28

6.25
0.42

5.49
1.04

1.35
0.54
4.55
12.70

1.10
0.89
6.34
2.91

0.31
0.57
10.36
13.33

0.65
0.111
18.88
11.37

0.40
0.81
14.00
8.23

2.10
0.40
13.611
5.43

Model

Criminal History
Race
Gender
Age
Judge
City

26.28
4.23
2.20

1.17
0.071

PRE/POST DFERENCE
Variable Group

Drug

Fraud Immig. Robbery

Criminal History
Race

8.50
2.91
3.15

0.69
-0.19
-0.29

14.54
10.85
-1.04

Gender
Age

-0.09
-1.06

0.26
0.83

-0.43
0.44

Judge
City

-2.92
6.50

-0.56

4.47
0.23

Model

1Variable

0.62

not significant at a .05 level.

Firearm Larceny

-3.90
-2.95

0.58
5.67

-1.88
0.71

1.43
-0.45
-1.00
3.08

-0.73
0.15

-0.36
0.93

0.67
-4.08

0.33
-2.55

-3.01

-1.14

-0.94
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(indicated on the Table) do not reach statistical significance,
but some general conclusions can be drawn.8
The size of the judge effect is substantially larger for separate offense types than it was for the total caseload, confirming
that differences among judges are more apparent as the specificity of the case characteristics increases. In the analysis reported in Table 2, judges on average accounted for 2.40% of
the variance in the pre-guideline era. Table 3 shows considerable variation among offense types but a uniformly larger effect
for judges, ranging from 5.89% for immigration to more than
16% for larceny. (The 18.08% for firearms cases was not statistically significant.)
For most offenses, the judge effects decrease under the
guidelines. The influence ofjudges on drug cases, for example,
drops from 7.47% to 4.55%. Robbery and immigration are different. This result surprised us and we reanalyzed the data excluding "outliers"--cases in which a judge's average sentence
was more than three standard deviations from the city mean for
that type of case. The size of the judge effect decreased for
postguideline cases about 1% for immigration and 4% for robbery. But they remained the largest significant judge effects of
all offense types and the only two that increased under the
guidelines. Some hypotheses about why disparity may have increased for these two offenses are discussed in Part IV.
For most offense types the city effect also decreases under
the guidelines or increases less than one percent. But for drug
cases the city effect increases 6.5%. Because such a large portion of the federal criminal docket is comprised of drug cases,
the increase in the city effect found in the combined case analysis may be due largely to drug sentencing. The increase could
reflect greater differences among the cities in the types of drug
'"1
These

results were obtained using a model that included gender, age, and race

as explanatory variables. The effects of these characteristics were generally small at
both time periods for every offense type. In several instances they do not reach statistical significance. Race is associated with a larger share of variation and its importance in drug cases increases in the guideline era, reflecting the impact of differential
treatment of crack and powder cocaine under the mandatory penalty statutes, and
the disproportionate number of African-American offenders sentenced under the
harsher crack laws. See supraPart I.C.1; see also infra Technical Appendix.
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cases sentenced now compared to 1984/1985, or the greater
spread of sentences for drug offenses proscribed under the
guidelines, ranging from probation to life in prison, which
would magnify any caseload differences that existed among the
cities.
Or it could reflect differences in the way that various
cities are implementing the drug guidelines.
2. Findingsfor Different Cities
The findings for separate cities mirror the findings for offense types-while the guidelines have in most instances reduced inter-judge disparity, pockets of problems remain and in
some cases disparity may have worsened. We determined the
judge effect for each of the cities having at least three judges at
both time periods.'3 In twelve cities the judge effect was statistically significant at both time periods. In seven of these interjudge disparity was reduced by 1% to 5%. In two there was essentially no change. In three it increased by 1% to 3%.
The dramatic growth of the main city effect for drug cases,
as shown in Table 3, suggests that different cities may be reacting differently to the drug guidelines and that these reactions
are magnifying differences among them. An additional concern
is that individual judges within each city are also reacting differently to the drug guidelines. To test this possibility we analyzed
drug cases in the nine cities where the same judges sentenced
during both time periods. Too few cases were available in five
of the cities to achieve statistical significance at either time.
However, in the four that achieved significance, two showed reductions of inter-judge disparity and two showed increases. This
suggests that the drug guidelines are affecting different cities
differently, both through development of distinct city-wide ad) For example, even if differences among cities in the portion of small-scale or
large-scale drug offenders remained constant over the two time periods, the greater
difference in the sentences imposed on these two types of offenders would appear in
our data as an increase in the city effect for drug offenses.
' A simple one-way analysis of variance without any control variables was used.
Since cases are randomly assigned in each city included in the analysis, each judge
should get a comparable distribution of offense types and offender characteristics.
The comparability of caseloads were checked in our tests of randomness. See infra
Technical Appendix.
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aptations and also in the degree to which the guidelines constrain individual judge discretion.
What should be made of these results? The simplest bottom
line is that the guidelines appear to affect different crimes in
different ways in different cities. While the guidelines, on balance, appear to be reducing aggregate inter-judge disparity and
to be succeeding more often than they are failing, problem areas remain. Some evidence even suggests an increase in disparity in some places and with some types of offenses.
IV. EXPLAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE
GUIDELINES

The nationwide results, showing a decrease in overall interjudge disparity, should hearten supporters of sentencing reform. But the unevenness of the results may cause some to
question whether the guidelines have been worth the trouble.
We believe there are reasons to judge the sentencing guidelines
as a qualified success, and reasons to hope that additional improvements would reduce disparity further. But before discussing this conclusion, it is important to confront some of the
questions that might be raised about our findings.
A. IS THE INTER-JUDGE DISPARITY WE FOUND TOO SMALL TO
WORRY ABOUT?

The judge effects we found were statistically significant but
generally small, particularly in light of the simulation studies
discussed in Part I, which reported primary judge effects of up
to 20% of the total variation in sentences. Our findingm-of
primary judge effects of less than 3% in the pre-guideline era
for the combined caseload-suggests that the influence of
judges was not as great in the real world as was indicated by the
simulation studies. Perhaps the hypothetical cases used in the
simulations accentuated differences of opinion to a greater extent than does the actual docket. Both types of studies demonstrate that the influence of judges on sentences is minor
compared to the seriousness of the offense.
As described previously, however, the primary judge effect is
like the tip of the disparity iceberg. Differences among judges
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in their overall tendency to be lenient or severe are not as great
as differences over the appropriate sentence in individual or
similar types of cases. We know from the simulation and
matched-group studies that the more specific the case, the more
disparity is apparent. This disparity lies hidden below the
caseload averages measured by the primary judge effect, which
is only a rough barometer of the degree of individual case disparity. Two of our findings support this view. First, the judge
effect was uniformly larger in our analyses of separate offense
types than in our combined case analyses. Second, the interaction effect for offense type by judges was significant and generally larger than the primary judge effect, which indicates that
knowing what type of case a judge is sentencing gives you more
information than does knowing only his or her average leniency
or severity.
Ultimately, whether a certain amount of disparity is enough
to worry about is a value judgment best left to policymakers.
Our findings suggest there was substantial disparity among similar cases in the pre-guidelines era, but less inter-judge disparity
under the guidelines.
B. ARE THE DECREASES IN DISPARITY LARGE ENOUGH TO PROVE
THE GUIDELINES' SUCCESS?

The success of the guidelines would be clear if the primary
judge and city effects and the interaction effects fell to zero and
were not statistically significant after implementation of the
guidelines. The actual data are more complicated. The primary judge effect was cut almost by half in the nine-cities analysis but only by a third in the forty-one-cities analysis. The
offense type by judge interaction fell in the forty-one-cities
analysis, but actually increased in the nine-cities analysis. In the
separate offense analyses, the judge effect fell for four offenses,
but increased for two. Some may look at these results and conclude that the guidelines' success at reducing inter-judge disparity is a wash.
At this point we can only speculate about why inter-judge
disparity in immigration and robbery cases .may have become
worse. Immigration has been the subject of numerous legislative initiatives in recent years that have generally increased pen-
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alties. These often-controversial initiatives may be unevenly apOther commentators have noted that charge bargainplied.'
ing is especially likely to involve guideline circumvention in
bank robbery cases. 8 Charges for possession of a firearm during the commission of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are
also unevenly prosecuted.137 Since conviction for each additional bank robbery count and each firearm count under §
924(c) adds substantial time to the offender's sentence, any disparity in prosecution can have dramatic effects.
On balance, we claim modest success for the guidelines at
reducing inter-judge disparity for several reasons. First, we
place greatest emphasis on the primary judge effect. The interaction effect is more difficult to interpret. Its increase in the
nine-cities analysis may be an aberration affected by the relatively small number of cities available in that analysis. Similarly,
we are heartened that the judge effect decreased in the two
largest offense groups, drugs and fraud, which together account
for over half of all defendants in the federal system.
Most important, the results from our natural experiment
should be considered in conjunction with findings from previous research. Together, the simulation, matched group, and
natural experiment methods provide converging evidence that
the guidelines have had an overall positive effect. Our results
are consistent with the basic finding from pre-guideline simulation studies: philosophical differences among judges were the
chief source of unwarranted disparity in the pre-guideline era.
The reduction in the primary judge effect we found is consistent
with the Commission's Four-YearEvaluation,88 which showed significant reductions in the dispersion of sentences imposed on

"' Recent findings indicate that similar immigration offense conduct is prosecuted
under different statutes and has different rates of departure from district to district,
leading to substantial differences in final sentences. Linda Drazga Maxfield & Keri
Burchfield, Immigration Offenses: Does Federal Guideline Practice Apply the Principles of Sentencing?, Paper Presented at the American Society of Criminology Annual
Conference (Nov. 13, 1998).
6 Nagel & Schulhofer, supranote 56, at 548.
'37 Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencingfor Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving
Firearms,37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 741 (2000) (showing that § 924(c) charges are brought
in less than half of the cases in which they appear factually warranted).
'S See FOUR-YEAR EVALUATION, supranote 48.
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similar matched cases. In addition, the natural experiment provided a piece of the puzzle that no other method could provide.
It enabled us to study the full felony caseloads of a large number of judges located in many cities throughout the country.
We believe our findings are representative and can be generalized to the federal system as a whole 9
However, more information would always be useful. Replication of our findings would give us greater confidence in the
results. Additional studies using matched group or simulation
approaches are possible. In the methodological review of earlier
studies in Part I we suggested ways that future studies using
these methods might be improved. We urge continued research using a variety of methods.
C. HAVE OTHER SOURCES OF DISPARITYWORSENED?

1. ProsecutorialDiscretionand Plea Bargaining
In Part I.D.1 we described several potential problems that
might prevent the guidelines from reducing unwarranted disparity. Our findings suggest that whatever disparity may still be
arising from judicial departure from the guidelines, or from lax
or inconsistent application of vague or complex provisions,
these problems do not offset the reduction of inter-judge disparity achieved by implementation of the guidelines. One of
the most common criticisms of the new regime, however, is that
the guidelines have transferred
control of sentencing from the
140
judge to the prosecutor.

,9 Our requirement that cities have at least three active judges did eliminate singlejudge courthouses and smaller cities from our analyses. We can think of no reason why the guidelines should restrict the discretion ofjudges in small cities any more
or less than judges in larger cities; the same variation we found among larger cities is
likely also present among smaller ones. There may, however, be differences between
large and small cities that affect the sentencing system in unforeseen ways.
,. WES, supra note 59;Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure 207
N.Y. L.J. 2 (1992) ("[T] he guidelines have sub silentio moved the locus of discretion
from the judge to the prosecutor."); Bennett L. Gershmann, The Most Fundamental
Changes in the CriminalJustice System: The Role of the Prosecutorin Sentence Reduction, 5
CRim. JUST. 2, 4 (1990) ("Since the prosecutor is able to make a very precise selection
of the ultimate sentence, the judge's role is simply to ratify the choice of sentence determined by the prosecutor."); Heaney, supranote 79, at 190-200; Standen, supranote
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In addition to the discretion they have always enjoyed to
bring and dismiss charges or to make sentence recommendations, the last ten years have witnessed the creation of new tools
by which prosecutors can control sentencing. 14 ' These include
mandatory minimum statutes that limit judges' discretion, motions for departure based on a defendant's substantial assistance
in the prosecution of others, which are solely in the hands of
and factual stipulations accompanying plea
prosecutors,
agreements, which under the guidelines have a direct and predictable impact on the guideline range applicable to a case.
The mechanisms designed to regulate this discretion-Department of Justice policies, "real offense" elements of the sentencing guidelines, and judicial review of plea agreements-may not
decisions from reintrobe capable of preventing prosecutorial
3
ducing unwarranted disparity.1

In this study we have not quantified the extent to which
prosecutorial discretion may be introducing disparity back into
the system. Some of the inter-judge disparity we found in our
study could be inter-prosecutor disparity.44 But if prosecutors
are introducing disparities, and if those disparities are randomly
63, at 1473-74 (arguing that restrictions on judicial discretion give prosecutors almost
limitless control over sentencing and thus plea bargaining).
14 For a recent excellent discussion of the tools by which prosecutors can control
sentences, see STrrH & CABRANES, supranote 43.
112Kimberly S. Kelley, Comment, Substantial Assistance Under the Guidelines: How
Smitherman TransfersDiscretionfromJudges To Prosecutors,76 IowA L. RFv. 187 (1990).
" See Paul J. Hofer, Plea Agreements, Judicial Discretion, and Sentencing Goals, FJC
DIREtMONS, May 1992, at 3 (describing importance ofjudicial review in preventing
bargains from undermining sentencing reform and citing obstacles to its exercise);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Facing the New Department of Justice, 5 FED.
SENTENcaNG REP. 225 (1993) (discussing disparity caused by uneven respect for the
guidelines among prosecutors making plea agreements and suggesting five areas
where improved DOJ policies are needed).
"4 Inter-prosecutor disparity might appear as interjudge disparity in our study to
the extent that prosecutors are linked to judges in each city. In some locations,
prosecutors are assigned to a particular judge. Disparity due to prosecutors would
appear there as inter-judge disparity in our data, because the lenient or severe charging or bargaining decisions of a particular prosecutor would be reflected in the data
for the judge to which he or she was assigned. (The judge, of course, might affect
these charging and bargaining decisions in various ways.) In other locations, a given
prosecutor may appear before many or all judges in the city. In these cities, differences among prosecutors would be distributed among the judges in our analysis and
would be concealed from our analysis.
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distributed among the judges in a city, our methodology would
not detect it and could not measure whether prosecutor-based
disparity had increased or decreased under the guidelines. Further, the city effect may reflect differences in charging and plea
bargaining policies around the country, and the growth of the
city effect may indicate that these differences are having a
greater impact today than they did in the pre-guidelines era. In
short, the guidelines may have constrained judicial discretion
successfully but allowed prosecutorial discretion to replace it.
Our methodology cannot disentangle these two sources.
Findings from other studies raise the real possibility that
prosecutorial discretion is reintroducing disparity. Former
Commissioner Ilene Nagel and Professor Stephen Schulhofer
conducted the most thorough series of studies of plea bargaining under the guidelines.14 5 They cataloged the ways that plea
bargaining can undermine the goals of the Sentencing Reform
Act and estimated, based on case reviews and interviews in ten
districts, that in approximately 20-35% of cases resolved by
guilty pleas the sentence imposed is not the one required by
strict application of the guidelines.4
It seems likely that in
some of these cases similar defendants get dissimilar bargains.
Survey research has also suggested that plea agreements affect sentences. The vast majority of judges believe that plea
bargains lead to disparity in at least some cases, and both prosecutors and judges report that plea agreements do not always reflect the total offense conduct. 147 Weakness in the evidence, the
defendant's cooperation, the need to provide incentives for
early pleas, and the need to avoid excessive sentences that
4 See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 56. See also Milton Heumann, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and NegotiatedJustice, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 223, 223-24 (1991);
David N. Yellen, Two Cheers For A Tale of Three Cities, 66 So. CAL. L. REV. 567, 571
(1992) (arguing that the amount of manipulation will increase over time as the institutional commitment to the Sentencing Reform Act declines and caseload pressures
mount).
...
Shulhofer & Nagel, PleaNegotiations,supra note 69, at 1290.
'47JOHNSON & GILBERT, supra note 45, at 9 (showing large majorities ofjudges and
probation officers believe that plea bargains are a hidden source of disparity in the
guideline system); FOUR-YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 48, at 161-98; see generally Berman, supra note 72, at 300 (reporting survey results that plea agreements often do not
contain the full offense conduct).
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would be unjust in particular cases are all cited as reasons for allowing defendants to reach plea agreements that do not reflect
the full offense conduct.
These findings suggest a pressing need for quantitative empirical evaluation of how prosecutorial discretion is affecting the
uniformity of sentencing. But the obstacles to such research are
immense. There are no data on how much disparity was caused
by prosecutorial decisions in the pre-guideline era, so pre/post
comparisons are impossible. Even more limited questions
about the effects of prosecutors today are not easily answered.
If uniform sentencing is defined as treating offenders similarly
based on what they really did, instead of what prosecutors are
willing and able to prove they did, then we need an impartial assessment of the offender's real offense conduct.
The federal system has an advantage over virtually all state
systems for the investigation of prosecutorial discretion, because
under the real-offense guidelines the probation officer is instructed to act as the court's investigator. The presentence report is intended to reflect the offender's actual offense
conduct. 4 8 But the probation office has limited resources and
must often rely on the government's version of the offense. If
researchers are to identify truly similar offenders, they must either accept the facts in the presentence report, win the cooperation of prosecutors, or go into the field and accompany law
enforcement agents on their investigations.
Given the importance of establishing the impartiality of all
aspects of the criminal justice system, cooperative efforts to
evaluate the roles of prosecutors and the influence of offender
characteristics would be in everyone's interest. Though perfect
data may never be available, measures of the type of cooperation provided by a defendant and the quality of evidence supporting various charges would permit more careful evaluation
than has so far been possible.
148 PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERV. DIV., ADMINISTRATVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,

THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR DEFENDANTS'

SENTENCES UNDER THE

SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, Publication 107 at 1-3 (Revised 1992) ("[I]t is cru-

cial that a probation officer exercise independence as an agent of the court by developing factual and rule-based assertions.").
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2. RegionalDifferences
In our view, the most troubling finding from this study is
the growth of the city effect. In Part I we discussed how regional differences were a potential source of disparity in the
pre-guideline era. Our findings show that the city in which the
case is sentenced continues to matter for some types of cases.
Although the findings are not as easily interpreted as the findings regarding judges (because cases are not randomly assigned
to cities) the offense type and criminal history variables controlled to some extent for differences in caseloads. On balance,
we are left with an uneasy suspicion that some types of inter-city
disparities have increased under the guidelines.
Table 3 shows that the increase in inter-city disparity occurred almost entirely in drug cases. The drug guidelines are
among the most-criticized in the manual, 149 and even the guidelines' strongest supporters recognize that changes in the drug
guidelines may be needed. 50 Some persons believe that the severe punishments required by the mandatory minimum statutes
and the guidelines are inappropriate for these offenses. Other
critics accept that punishment is appropriate, but contend that
the current rules do a poor job of apportioning punishment
based on the seriousness of the crime.15 '
"' GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 17 (harshness and inflexibility of drug guideline
most frequent problem cited by interviewees; examples of unwarranted disparity attributed to guideline); Peter Reuter &Jonathan P. Caulkins, Redefining the Goals of National Drug Policy: Recommendations from a Working Group, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1059,
1062 (1995). Reuter and Caulkins reported the recommendations of a RAND corporation working group, which concluded:
Federal sentences for drug offenders are often too severe: they offend justice, serve
poorly as drug control measures, and are very expensive to carry out.... The U.S. Sentencing Commission should review its guidelines to allow more attention to the gravity of the
offense and not simply to the quantity of the drug.
id.
50Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons
in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wisc. L. REv. 679, 747-49
(1996).
,'Many have attributed these problems to the drug guidelines' emphasis on drug
quantity. They argue that quantity often fails to discriminate among more and less
culpable defendants and is based on manipulatable, arbitrary, or unreliable factors.
SeeJudicial Conference of the United States (JCUS), 1995 Annual Report of theJCUS to
the U. S. Sentencing Commission (Mar. 1995), at 2 ("[T] he Judicial Conference... encourages the Commission to study the wisdom of drug sentencing guidelines which
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Given this criticism, it is not surprising that pressures from
the Department of Justice and from the Commission to apply
the drug guidelines strictly and uniformly have met with resistance. It seems likely that this resistance has taken different
forms in different places and that, as a consequence, regional
disparity has increased. To compensate for the new controls
from Washington, new types of discretion have been invented,
in the form of charging and declination policies, 52 novel plea
bargains such as fact bargains,153 "hidden" departures,154 and
other arrangements. These bring back into the system some of
the flexibility that judges, attorneys, and probation officers
think is needed to keep the system working and to avoid unfairness. Ironically, the proliferation of new rules in the past ten
years has created more ways that cities might differ from one
another in how they deploy, and in some cases circumvent, the
rules.
Based on anecdotal reports and some previous research, it
seems likely that different adaptations in different cities accounts for the growth of inter-city disparity under the guidelines.

5

While

inter-judge

disparity

for drug

cases

has

decreased, differences among cities are creating more regional
are driven virtually exclusively by the quantity or weight of the drugs involved. The
Conference commends the Commission's efforts to study the drug guidelines with
new eyes, based on the experience of the past several years."). See also Hon. William
W. Wilkins et al., Competing SentencingPolicies in a "War on Drugs"Era,28 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 305, 320-24 (1993).
112 U.S. Attorneys have discretion to decline to prosecute. In many cases concurrent federal and state jurisdiction provide prosecutors with a choice of forum, which
often has profound consequences for the offender's exposure to punishment. See
Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, PreliminaryData on Race and Crack ChargingPracticesin
Los Angeles, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 36, 38 (1993) (showing disparity between state
prosecutions and federal prosecutions for the same crime). Some U.S. Attorney's offices simply do not prosecute drug couriers or mules unless they are repeat offenders
or involved with large amounts of drugs judged sufficient to make the case appropriate for federal court.
153 See generally Nagel & Schulhofer, The FirstFifteen Months, supra note 69, at 272-78;
Berman, supra note 72.
15 Freed, supranote 59, at 1723-24.
See generally Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 56; Heaney, supra note 79, at 556
(providing the best descriptions of the variety of procedures and local practices that
have developed under the guidelines and examples of how this variety could result in
disparity).
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disparity than existed before the guidelines. And because sentences have generally gotten much longer in drug cases, variation in the use of the new types of discretion have dramatic
effects on sentences. Especially given that the drug statutes and
guidelines are also implicated in the growth of the gap between
sentences for African-American, white, and Hispanic offenders,
these variations in application raise special concerns. 156
D. IMPROVING THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SYSTEM

The guidelines' mixed record helps account for why there is
still no consensus as to whether they have been successful. We
expect the mixed findings from this study to contribute, but not
to end, the debate. Rather than argue about whether the glass
is half empty or half full, we prefer to ask: What accounts for the
failure of the guidelines to reduce disparity for some types of offenses and in some cities? What changes might make this goal
attainable?
Research can help explore why the guidelines are not working everywhere.157 But based on what we already know today, we
do not believe uniform sentencing can be accomplished simply
by insisting that the rules be followed more closely. In theory,
disparity would be eliminated if prosecutors always charged
fully, never bargained away counts or facts that could be proven,
and if judges always strictly applied the guidelines to the facts
and departed only in extraordinary cases. But in practice, major reforms can seldom be dictated from above if they result in
outcomes that appear unworkable or unjust to the persons
asked to implement them. For the goal of uniformity to be
more fully achieved, judges should accept the policies of Congress and the Commission, even if they conflict with their own
philosophy. But Congress and the Commission should also in,6 See supraPart I.C.1.
,17The natural experiment methodology developed for this study may provide
more answers. For example, future analyses could explore whether departure rates
and the extent of departure are similar among judges in a given city. Comparative
case studies of individual districts, showing connections between various prosecutorial
and judicial practices, also appear promising. See Lisa M. Farabee, DisparateDepartures
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569
(1998).

306

HOFER, BLACKWELL, &RUBACK

[Vol. 90

form those policies with the experience of prosecutors and
judges who know first-hand the varying circumstances of crimes
and the individual characteristics of offenders.

